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ABSTRACT 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border security and immigration have 
received increased attention.  Public and political scrutiny have elevated and changed the 
priority of border security and immigration enforcement; from migrant workers seeking 
employment to counter-terrorism.  However, the question remains: if United States law 
enforcement and security agencies are unable to stop the smuggling of drugs and illegal 
migrants across the southwestern border between the U.S. and Mexico, is it possible to 
prevent terrorists from gaining unauthorized and unaccountable entry into the heartland 
of the U.S.?  A corollary question is: given attempts to restructure the immigration 
enforcement policy and infrastructure to deter illegal entry of terrorists, will it still be 
possible and lucrative for terrorists to attempt to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border?  
This research seeks to explore existing conditions that may facilitate or increase the 
likelihood that terrorists would seek to infiltrate personnel across the U.S.-Mexico border. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
―The range of criminal activity on the Southwest Border is limited only by 
the demands of the illicit markets served.‖ 
Cato (Council.), Center for Immigration Studies, 20081 
Months of planning and preparation were about to be tested in a 
transcontinental move dependent upon loose connections, promises, and 
money.  Hassan joined Ashraf, who supplied the first round of documents 
he would need on his journey, and reviewed the details of the operation.  
Rehearsing mnemonics for names of contacts, modes of transportation, 
and critical times helped Hassan focus, especially since he could not 
travel with a written itinerary and risk compromising his organization if 
captured.  Hassan boarded a plane and set off on his journey from 
Lebanon to Cuba in eight days.  Flying through Dubai, Hassan breathed a 
sigh of relief when the paperwork Ashraf provided made his flights to 
Moscow and Cuba smooth.  Staying briefly in Cuba, Hassan boarded his 
last plane and set off for Ecuador.  Hassan avoided flying into Venezuela, 
worried about its heavy focus from the international law enforcement 
community.  Ecuador was specifically chosen because it has no 
requirement for visas and too many foreign travelers to cope with.   
In Ecuador Hassan stayed with Iam, an Ecuadorian-Arab compatriot 
of Hassan’s organization.  Iam coordinated travel arrangements while 
Hassan set about minimizing his Arab appearance: he cut his hair, wore 
local clothes Iam provided and practiced Spanish phrases with 
Ecuadorians working in Iam’s travel agency.   After nine weeks in 
Ecuador, Hassan loaded onto a boat taking a large number of other 
northbound migrants.  Unlike the other Arab passengers who still stood 
                                                 
1 Cato (Council.), ―The Weaponization of Immigration,‖ Center for Immigration Studies, March 10, 
2008,  2, http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back108.pdf   
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out despite changing their dress, Hassan smoothly melted into the crowd 
of South Americans.  Arriving in Guatemala, Hassan linked up with 
Francesco, a Guatemalan-Arab who put Hassan up with a Muslim family 
living in the back of a small café.  Hassan would sweep floors for another 
three weeks, continually working on his Spanish while Francesco 
coordinated his onward movement.  On his twenty-third night in 
Guatemala, Francesco moved him to a large riverbank where Hassan was 
taken across on a makeshift raft.  Hassan was quickly rushed to a waiting 
van and driven to a featureless house where he stopped before traveling 
by bus to just south of Mexico City.  From that point he was transferred to 
a different car or truck every day until he reached a small village just 
south of Nogales.   
Now began the most risky portion of Hassan’s journey.  In Nogales, he 
left the comfort of his Latin American Muslim smugglers and surrendered 
himself to the care of a Mexican smuggling outfit.  Fortunately for 
Hassan, his organization had a prior arrangement with the Mexican 
smugglers.  While Hassan was no stranger to the heat of the desert, hiking 
through scrabble and rock over varying elevations was arduous, and he 
often wondered if the teenage “coyote” leading his twelve-man group 
across the desert knew where he was going.  Hassan hoped the $8,000 
that had been paid for his passage had bought the services of a higher 
caliber smuggler.  On the first night he was reassured when he saw how 
deftly the young coyote used a handheld GPS, satellite phone, night vision 
goggles and the meticulous care with which he concealed their tracks 
when they were not in the rocks.   
Eventually, the human convoy came out on a road where the coyote 
and Hassan were loaded into a car.  Hassan quickly found himself on I-19 
heading north.  Despite hunger, dehydration and exhaustion, he felt 
overwhelmingly happy and satisfied.  He had safely crossed the border 
 3 
into the U.S., but, more importantly, he had done so without any 
documentation or detection by law enforcement.   
Hassan received a new set of documents in the car, which he was told 
were only temporary until he reached his next destination.  Several vehicle 
changes later, Hassan arrived in Denver.   
Hassan met his lifelong friend Nishan who, in a now familiar pattern, 
moved Hassan in with a local family.  Nishan also provided Hassan with 
his new American passport, driver’s license, and social security card.  
Most importantly, Nishan introduced Hassan to a select group of men 
from the community:  some Hassan knew from Lebanon, others he knew 
by reputation.  Hassan was able to provide them with updated guidance 
and new directions and strategies for recruitment and fund raising.  
Hassan’s role was to conduct advanced recruitment and oversee the 
routing of financial resources; he was to have no public role.   
The above vignette is a mix of fiction and reality, based on stories told by 
apprehended illegal aliens from Special Interest Countries (ASIC). 2  While many of 
these individuals are doubtless legitimate refugees fleeing persecution and failing states, 
nothing prevents others from embarking on circuitous routes like this to evade the eye of 
law enforcement.   
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether conditions exist that would 
facilitate transnational terrorist organizations‘ use of Mexico as a conduit to infiltrate 
personnel clandestinely into the United States.  More specifically, this thesis will examine 
how the existence of these conditions not only makes it possible for terrorists to infiltrate 
and destabilize the U.S. homeland, but increases the likelihood that terrorists will exploit 
these conditions until the U.S. revises its current policies and procedures.   
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines Special Interest Countries (SIC) as countries whose 
governments support state sponsored terrorism or who promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations 
and their members. 
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The primary focus of this thesis is on factors that specifically contribute to the 
ease or difficulty in smuggling personnel across the U.S.‘s southwestern border with 
Mexico.  My working assumption is that a porous border can facilitate crossing by 
individuals who want to stay outside the purview of law enforcement.  This thesis also 
assumes that only a small number of terrorists need to enter the U.S. to pose a credible 
threat to national security.  Furthermore, the potential for surreptitious terrorist entry is 
not time sensitive.  Terrorist networks and operations can be developed over an extended 
period of time, as evidenced by Mohammed Atta‘s plan to attack the World Trade Center, 
an operation which took over two and a half years to develop.
3 
 The specific focus of this 
thesis is on the potential for human smuggling, not the trafficking of materiel.  I explore 
factors that could increase the appeal for terrorists to exploit northern Mexico for illegal 
entry into the U.S., as opposed to utilizing legal methods for infiltrating personnel into 
the U.S.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Even before the Mexican-American War and the establishment of the Rio Grande 
as the U.S.-Mexican border with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, there was a 
long history of personnel and materiel moving back and forth across the region.  Most 
recently, strong U.S. economy and labor shortages served as the motivation for millions 
of Mexican and Central-South American immigrants to enter the U.S. in search of jobs 
and prosperity.  Legislation, such as the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, only 
served to further fuel illegal migration by granting amnesty to over 2.7 million 
unauthorized migrants to the U.S.4  The U.S. had a relatively relaxed policy on illegal 
immigration until the 1990s, when local and state social services began to feel the strain.  
Yet, nothing had quite the impact of the attacks of September 11, 2001.  These attacks in 
the U.S. served as a wakeup call and drew attention to a myriad of shortcomings and 
vulnerabilities in immigration policies, leading many to question the integrity of the 
                                                 
3 Cato, Weaponization of Immigration, 2. 
4 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Immigration: Policy Considerations 
Related to Guest Worker Programs by Andorra Bruno, report no. RL32044 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2006), 32. 
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U.S.‘s borders.  Following 9/11, heightened security measures and increased scrutiny at 
traditional ports of entry (POE) along the U.S. border forced many wishing to enter the 
U.S. illegally to rely on historic overland smuggling routes through the southwestern U.S.   
Far more sinister than individuals seeking higher paying jobs or a better quality of 
life, terrorists seeking to conduct destabilizing attacks on U.S. soil could exploit these 
well-established human trafficking routes to gain undetected entry into the U.S.  With so 
much attention focused on our endeavors to defeat terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
other foreign countries, we forget that conducting a dramatic attack in the U.S. continues 
to be a top operational goal for transnational terrorist organizations.
5 
  
In many senses, immigration is the ―indispensable asymmetric weapon,‖ making 
America not only a target for terrorism, but also an ideal staging ground for such attacks.6  
Despite significant successes in border and immigration enforcement, only 10–30% of 
illegal immigrants are detained by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP).7  With such a large 
number of personnel potentially slipping across the border undetected, there exists the 
distinct likelihood that terrorist operatives could be successfully smuggled into the U.S. 
across the U.S.-Mexico border.   
Terrorist organizations possess three options for developing terror networks 
within a country.  First, they can legally infiltrate operatives through visa or asylum 
programs, who then melt into the host country population.  Second, terrorists can illegally 
infiltrate operatives.  Illegal infiltration can be achieved by two methods:  utilizing 
fraudulent documents or taking advantage of corrupt authorities to cross at traditional 
ports of entry.  Alternatively, terrorists can illegally cross the border in between 
                                                 
5 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Hearings before the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 109
th
 Cong. 39 (2005) (Statement of James Loy, Deputy 
Secretary U.S. Department Of Homeland Security). 
6 Cato, Weaponization of Immigration, 2. 
7 House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations, A Line in the Sand:  
Confronting the Terror Threat at the Southwest Border, ed. Michael T. McCaul, chairman (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 4.  While illegal immigration numbers seem to be at their lowest level 
since the Nixon administration, this still means the 340,252 aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 
represents a fraction of those thought to have entered the U.S.  KSAZ Phoenix, ―Far Less People Entering 
US Illegally from Mexico,‖ Fox News Latino, December 13, 2011, 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/12/13/far-less-people-entering-us-illegally-from-mexico/ 
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traditional ports of entry.  The first method carries the inherent risk that fraudulent 
documents may be detected and the potential operative subsequently detained by law 
enforcement.  For its part, illegal entry between ports of entry also carries risks, however, 
it has the advantage of keeping the operative anonymous and hidden from law 
enforcement.  Finally, and in combination with the first two methods, a homegrown 
terrorist operative can be developed.  Homegrown operatives are assimilated citizens who 
possess rights and often lack any distinguishing features or history that would identify 
them to law enforcement.  All three options offer distinct advantages and disadvantages.  
While this thesis will present evidence of homegrown terror operatives, its main focus 
will be to investigate the potential for illegally infiltrating operatives between traditional 
ports of entry as a means to establish terror networks and activities within the U.S. 
Several analysts discount the likelihood that terrorist organizations would take 
this course of action.  However, while it is true that over 21 terror-related plots have been 
foiled since 9/11, five have succeeded to some degree.8 This demonstrates that while 
sensational 9/11-type attacks are not happening, planning and attempting to execute terror 
operations continues to take place on American soil.  While some might dismiss the 
wannabes who are snared with relative ease by authorities, others point to these activities 
as evidence of trained U.S. terror operatives acting on orders of a hidden network 
commanded and controlled, or at least orchestrated, by terrorist leaders from abroad.9 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis poses two questions. First, under what conditions might terrorists be 
able to easily infiltrate the U.S.?  To answer this question requires exploring conditions 
that might make it attractive for transnational terror organizations to attempt to infiltrate 
operatives into the U.S. across the U.S.-Mexico border.  To answer this question also 
 
 
                                                 
8 The Vigilance Project:  An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases Against the Homeland (New York:  New 
York State Intelligence Center, 2010), 9.   
9 Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman and Katherine Tiedemann, ―Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to 
America and American Interests,‖ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34, no. 2 (2011): 71. 
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means exploring which mechanisms or environmental factors would make human 
smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border preferable to using higher visibility legal 
methods for entry of personnel into the U.S.   
Second, if transnational terror organizations were to find clandestine entry across 
the U.S.-Mexico border attractive, what steps could be taken to mitigate the conditions or 
factors that make this attractive?  In other words, how can we better deter further 
infiltration across the U.S.-Mexico border? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two pervasive views regarding illegal smuggling of terror operatives 
into the U.S. across its shared border with Mexico.  While those in each camp 
acknowledge that the potential exists, those in the first school of thought argue that 
heightened border security and revisions to immigration policy on the U.S. side following 
9/11 are sufficient to deter terrorist infiltration.  According to authors in this camp, a 
comprehensive increase in security makes illegal entry too difficult.  The alternative point 
of view is that terrorists will adapt their methods to infiltrate operatives into the heartland 
of the U.S. regardless. 
Among those who contend that transnational terror organizations will continue to 
actively seek to infiltrate the U.S., there is a split over methods.  Terrorist organizations 
have two basic options: use of fraud to enter through a legal port of entry or illegal entry 
between ports of entry.  Increased manpower and technological advances at traditional 
ports of entry have dramatically improved the ability of border enforcement agents to 
identify and prevent illegal entry.  Furthermore, technological advances in screening 
systems, such as biometric identification technology, record immigrant information and 
store it on nationally accessible databases.  Terrorist organizations seeking to infiltrate 
operatives and maintain a low profile for reasons of operational security are likely to 
want to avoid such recognition devices.  This suggests that terror organizations seeking to 
keep their activities off the radar of law enforcement are likely to avoid the high risk of 
recognition and detention at ports of entry.  This view is seems to be shared by senior 
 8 
level U.S. stakeholders, such as Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security James Loy, who 
boldly stated before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2005: 
Recent information from ongoing investigations, detentions, and emerging 
threat streams strongly suggests that al Qaeda has considered using the 
Southwest Border to infiltrate the United States. Several al Qaeda leaders 
believe operatives can pay their way in to the country through Mexico and 
also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for 
operational security reasons.10 
Avoiding detection by law enforcement leaves terrorist organizations little choice 
but to try to infiltrate between ports of entry.  The literature suggests three alternatives for 
surreptitious entry through illegal channels for terrorists.  Terrorists could: mingle within 
the sea of existing illegal migrants, utilize criminal organizations and routes operated by 
criminal networks, or develop their own exclusive networks and routes.
11 
  
According to the Mexican Secretary of Governance for the Interior, already in 
2005 there were several international terrorist cells actively operating in Mexico, to 
include those belonging to or representing extremist Islamic groups.  The Centro de 
Investigacion y Seguridad Nacional (Mexican National Center for Investigation and 
Security) for its part released a report noting the existence of radical support cells within 
Muslim communities in Mexican states, several of which lie along the shared border with 
the U.S.  This report goes on to say that federal authorities believe these radical support 
cells are clearly involved in human trafficking.12  Thomas Davidson of the Jamestown 
Foundation speculates that a salafi network exists in Mexico, running from the 
southernmost state of Chiapas all the way north to the U.S.-Mexico border.  This network 
is positioned along key movement corridors and could thus provide any needed support.
13
 
                                                 
10 Cato, Weaponization of Immigration, 6. 
11 Susan Ginsburg, Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy (Washington: 
Migration Policy Institute, 2006), 74. 
12 Thomas Davidson, ―Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central America,‖ 
Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 22 (2005): 7, http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/jamestown.pdf 
13 Davidson, ―Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central America,‖ 8.  
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The desire of terrorist organizations to avoid detection and remain secretive 
impacts their ability to have robust border crossing capabilities.  The probability of 
exposure for a terrorist group establishing, testing, and operating smuggling operations is 
increasingly high.  Terrorist organizations may develop a support structure for moving 
operatives up to the border itself, but they would then likely utilize the services of 
existing smuggling networks who have greater operational knowledge of the 
environment. 
This leaves terrorist organizations two choices: mingle with migrants along 
historic illegal migration corridors, or employ criminal assistance and use routes 
established by criminal organizations.  One unintended consequence of increased scrutiny 
and security at traditional ports of entry and increased border enforcement and 
interdiction along historic human-drug smuggling routes is that human-drug smuggling 
has become more sophisticated, organized, and difficult to track. This, in turn, might 
make illegal human smuggling by these new means even more attractive to terror 
organizations.  Human trafficking is second only to drug trafficking in Mexico, in terms 
of the money it generates; it is a $15–$20 billion a year enterprise.  In fact, narco-
traffickers are now diversifying their activities and sources of income, finding smuggling 
to be a highly profitable venture.  Meanwhile, as cartels drive out small time smugglers 
and employ gangs to charge ―right of passage‖ fees for immigrants, all they have to do is 
simply modify existing routes and facilities already in place for smuggling drugs.14  
The literature is divided over the extent to which terror organizations collaborate 
with criminal organizations inside Mexico: there are those who believe a symbiotic 
relationship already exists, and those who believe criminal organizations do not want any 
association with terrorists.   
American analyst-author George Grayson and Mexican analyst Alejandro 
Schtulmann claim the terrorist-cartel connection is overblown and cartels will avoid 
colluding with terrorists in order to avoid antagonizing the U.S.  In their view, cartels are 
                                                 




in the business of making money and maintaining influence.  According to Grayson, 
cartels do not want U.S. boots on the ground, and would prefer to stick to only 
antagonizing and victimizing fellow Mexicans.
15 
The Department of Homeland 
Security‘s 2008–2013 threat assessment, One Team, One Mission, Securing Our 
Homeland, concludes, ―Mexican drug and alien smuggling organizations have little 
incentive to risk their lucrative operations by facilitating terrorists across the border.‖
16
  
The DHS also considered it unlikely that terrorist organizations would jeopardize the 
operational security of their operations through relationships with cartels.  Those who 
adhere to this view also contend that given the increasing sophistication of cross-border 
human smuggling, it is unlikely that terrorist organizations could rely on illegal entry 
between ports of entry as a viable means to clandestinely enter the U.S. without 
cooperation from cartels. 
Others, however, believe that criminal organizations in Mexico have already 
established working relationships to smuggle terror operatives into the U.S.  Anthony 
Kimery writes in his 2010 ―Southern Exposure‖ article that special schools have been 
established by Muslim businessmen in alliance with Mexican cartels to control human 
smuggling operations.  These schools assist terrorists by teaching them to speak Spanish 
and learn about Hispanic culture.  He attributes the decline in the apprehension of Special 
Interest Aliens (SIA)
 
17 by the U.S. Border Patrol to these greater precautions to prevent 
capture.18
 
 Michael Braun, retired Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) assistant 
administrator and chief of operations, believes terror organizations like Hezbollah are 
already working with Mexican drug cartels, utilizing the same weapons smugglers, 
document traffickers, and transportation experts.  In Braun‘s view, cartels are willing to 
work for the highest bidder, and when terror organizations have the funds, of course the 
                                                 
15 Sara Miller Llana, ―Iran assassination plot: Terrorists join forces with Mexican drug cartels?,‖ The 
Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-
Monitor/2011/1011/Iran-assassination-plot-Terrorists-join-forces-with-Mexican-drug-cartels  
16 Anthony Kimery, ―Unholy Trinity,‖ Homeland Security Today Magazine 6, no. 8 (2009): 32. 
17 Special Interest Aliens are defined by DHS as aliens from Special Interest Countries.  
18 Anthony Kimery, ―Southern Exposure,‖ Homeland Security Today Magazine 7, no. 8 (2010): 32. 
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cartels would do business with them.
19 
 As a study done for the Department of Defense 
(DoD) notes in the report Operation Cazando Anguilas (―Hunting Eels‖), ―profit now 




By working with terrorist organizations, cartels could not only gain new revenue, 
but also access to trade routes outside Central-South America.  In addition, terrorist 
operatives could train cartel and gang members in the use of weapons, explosives, and 
tunneling.  For their part, terror organizations would clearly benefit from being able to tap 
into narco-trafficking revenue streams and networks of corrupt shadowy officials, along 
with established and protected pipelines for smuggling humans across the border into the 
interior of the U.S. 
While what terrorists might or might not be able to do with cartels is subject to 
debate, a review of the current literature has failed to produce any substantive attention 
paid to the specific mechanisms transnational terror organizations could use to infiltrate 
operatives undetected into the U.S. Most authors focus on why terrorist organizations 
would or would not want to use illegal human smuggling networks to infiltrate operatives 
into the U.S.  Much less attention is paid to the actual conditions that may or may not 
make entry into the U.S. across this border an attractive prospect.   
Not only would a broader understanding of how the border can be penetrated 
provide greater insight into the ease with which terror operatives might cross it, but a 
deeper understanding should facilitate the evaluation of the likelihood that terrorists 
would actually use or prefer this method for infiltrating operatives into the U.S.   
E. ROAD MAP 
Despite claims that terrorists would be unlikely to use Mexico as a staging ground 
to get into the U.S., Mexico has been used to gain entry into the U.S. for adversarial 
                                                 
19 ―Hezbollah uses Mexican drug routes into U.S.,‖ The Washington Times, March 27, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/27/hezbollah-uses-mexican-drug-routes-into-us/print/  
20 Kimery, ―Unholy Trinity,‖ 32. 
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purposes in the past.  A quick survey demonstrates that state and non-state actors alike 
successfully smuggled human operatives across the U.S.-Mexico border:  the Germans 
for the purposes of sabotage during World War I, the Japanese to engage in espionage in 
Tijuana prior to World War II, and American Indian raiding parties way back in the 19
th
 
century.  Chapter II will examine these three instances when the border was exploited for 
subversive or disruptive purposes. Chapter III will review current border and immigration 
policy, and will examine characteristics and vulnerabilities that could appeal to terror 
organizations.  Chapter IV will investigate documented human smuggling operations, and 
their implications for successful infiltration of the U.S. from across the U.S.-Mexico 
border.  Chapter V will consider future scenarios and discuss methods to prevent 
infiltration by terror operatives.  Finally, this thesis will suggest avenues for further 
research and investigation.  
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II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE  
―There are such long stretches of unguarded territory that nothing much 
but laziness need drive a smuggler to take risks.‖ 
Dr. Altendorf testifying to U.S. Senate21 
Infiltration of the U.S.-Mexico border undetected into the U.S. has happened in 
the past.  Long before the post-9/11 threat of non-state transnational actors crossing the 
southwestern border, various state and non-state actors have used it as a means to gain 
access to the U.S. for subversive purposes. 
A. STATE SPONSORED SUBVERSION AND DESTABILIZATION 
1. German Saboteurs 
During the early years of World War I the German Empire did not want to incite 
the U.S. to enter the war in Europe or increase frictions between the U.S. and Germany. 
However, Germany needed to find a way to distract the U.S., weaken its influence in 
Europe, and reduce American material support to the British and other anti-German 
protagonists.  The Germans‘ most overt method was to attack shipping vessels carrying 
materiel from the U.S. to Britain using submarine warfare.  The less overt approach was 
to find a way to preoccupy American forces and slow exports.  This approach would 
involve sabotaging American targets on U.S. soil and keeping the focus of U.S. efforts 
oriented internally.  For a variety of reasons, the Germans could not dedicate the required 
assets to conduct direct attacks on U.S. ports or industrial facilities.  Not only were 
German resources already needed in Europe, but this direct approach would undoubtedly 
incite a retaliatory response from the U.S.   
Germany employed several strategies to subvert or disrupt the U.S. prior to and 
during WWI.  Officially recognized German diplomats, such as the German Consul to 
                                                 
21 Investigation of Mexican affairs, Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 66
th
 Cong. 467 (1919).  
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San Francisco, Franz von Bopp, made several attempts to instigate what turned out to be 
rash, impatient, ill-planned, and clumsy attempts at sabotage.  Fledgling attempts at 
clandestine warfare were in direct violation of American neutrality, and German 
diplomats engaging in them found themselves summarily arrested or expelled from the 
U.S. by 1916.22 This haphazard approach to subversion and sabotage brought German 
anti-American activities in the U.S. to the attention of U.S. federal agents like the U.S. 
Secret Service.   
Unable to directly attack the U.S. and its industrial base, the Germans turned to a 
more indirect approach using Mexico as a platform for destabilizing the U.S.  In an effort 
to use the Mexican Revolution to advantage, Germany backed ousted General Victoriano 
Huerta.  Its aim was to destabilize Mexico in order to draw in the U.S.  Facilitating 
several armed skirmishes along the border and allegedly supporting attacks by Pancho 
Villa on U.S. soil, Germany successfully caused enough of a disturbance for the U.S. to 
deploy troops under General John J. Pershing.23  What Germany perceived to be small 
successes then emboldened Arthur Zimmerman to make his infamous offer to Mexico, as 
he tried to incite a declared war between the U.S. and Mexico.   
As Foreign Secretary of the German Empire, Arthur Zimmerman sent directions 
to the German ambassador in Mexico City to propose an official alliance that would lead 
to Mexico declaring war against the U.S.  With the U.S. preoccupied on its southern 
border, it would hopefully be unable to move supplies and troops to the conflict in 
Europe.  In exchange for Mexico‘s alliance and assistance, Germany offered to help it 
regain territories lost to the U.S. in the form of Texas, Arizona, and California.  
Unfortunately for the Germans, the cable was intercepted and the telegram‘s contents 
quickly became known in the U.S.  Originally discounted, the telegram was later 
 
 
                                                 
22 Richard Spence, ―K.A. Jahnke and the German Sabotage Campaign in the United States and 
Mexico, 1914–1918,‖ Historian 59, no. 1 (1996): 98, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540–
6563.1996.tb00986.x/pdf. 
23 Mark Gilderhus, ―The United States and Carranza,‖ The Americas 29, no. 2 (1972): 220, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/979900. 
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confirmed as authentic by Arthur Zimmerman himself.  In the public eye and under 
pressure, Mexico denounced the Zimmerman Telegram and denied any allegiance to the 
German cause.24 
In contrast to failed efforts undertaken by high ranking officers and diplomats, 
German saboteurs operating in both Mexico and the U.S. were highly successful in 
carrying out operations and avoiding capture traversing the U.S.-Mexico border between 
1914–1918.  Several German agents operated within the U.S. Of particular note were 
Kurt Jahnke, Sidney Reilly, and Lothar Witzke.  Jahnke operated along the southern 
border of the U.S. He had a knack for smuggling and used illicit trade to develop 
networks on both sides of the border.  Jahnke largely operated out of the U.S. for much of 
1914–1917 until President Wilson‘s administration severed diplomatic relations with 
Germany upon the U.S.‘s entry into the war.   
As a member of German Naval Intelligence, Jahnke traveled throughout the 
western U.S., Mexico, and along the Pacific coast.  Initially he smuggled goods and drugs 
from U.S. and Mexican ports to Asia, later shifting to ammunition and arms which 
Germany wanted funneled to Mexican authorities.  Jahnke‘s extensive network of 
personal connections allowed him to jump across the U.S.-Mexico border with ease and 
avoid detection or detention by law enforcement.25 
In 1914, now a special agent of the German Admiralty Staff‘s Section for 
Intelligence and Sabotage, Jahnke began engaging in acts of sabotage along with Sidney 
Reilly.  Jahnke and Reilly blew up powder and other munitions shipments awaiting 
transport from west coast ports.  In 1915, they used Jahnke‘s cross-border contacts to 
facilitate secret shipments of arms and munitions into Mexico to support Huerta‘s 
fighters.26 
Jahnke and Reilly continued their activities throughout the western U.S. and 
Mexico until Jahnke was named chief for German intelligence for the western United 
                                                 
24 Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 199–200. 
25 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 92–93. 
26 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 96. 
 16 
States in 1916.  Berlin sent Jahnke further assistance in the form of Lothar Witzke, 
another German naval officer and accomplished saboteur.  Jahnke and Witzke undertook 
a series of attacks, beginning with a botched attack on British supply ships near the San 
Francisco docks that resulted in the bombing of a parade that killed ten people and 
maimed dozens of others.27  The most infamous attack this trio orchestrated was the July 
1916 explosion at Black Tom Island, New Jersey. 
German saboteurs set off explosions in the Black Tom Island munitions plant, 
resulting in an explosion that measured 5.5 on the Richter scale.  This explosion not only 
caused over $20 million in damage (the equivalent of $402 million in 2011 dollars), but 
also damaged portions of Ellis Island, the Statue of Liberty, killed 7 people, and injured 
hundreds of others.  Jahnke and his fellow saboteurs followed this up with further attacks, 
blowing up the Eddystone munitions plant in Philadelphia. In that attack the plant was 
destroyed and over 130 people were killed.28 Rough estimates put the total number of 
attacks at 43 factories destroyed by explosions or fire, along with four dozen ships 
carrying Allied war supplies destroyed by explosions between 1915 and 1917, before the 
U.S. and Germany were at war.29 
In 1917, the U.S. formally entered WWI and severed diplomatic relations with 
Germany.  In the summer of 1917 Mexico City became the base of the German Secret 
Service in Mexico, serving as the center of operations for espionage and sabotage 
directed at the U.S.  Mexico City served as an ideal headquarters, allowing German 
agents to operate openly and freely.  Although the Mexican government formally denied 
any involvement with German efforts, they were nevertheless conducted with the full 
cooperation of Mexican President Venustiano Carranza.  Carranza allowed German 
operatives to move about freely and openly, while the Germans provided Carranza with 
weapons and munitions, money, and training for his forces.  In fact, it was not uncommon 
for German officers to simultaneously serve as German captains and Mexican colonels.  
                                                 
27 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 100. 
28 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 104. 
29 Michael Warner, ―The Kaiser Sows Destruction: Protecting the Homeland the First Time Around,‖ 
Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 7, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol46no1/pdf/v46i1a02p.pdf     
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This enabled the Germans to operate unhindered, originating and launching subversive 
strikes in the U.S. from Mexico and attacking U.S. interests in Mexico.30  
In Mexico City Kurt Jahnke served as the head of German Naval Intelligence for 
North America.  Jahnke‘s goal was to establish Mexico as ―a safe haven for German 
covert warfare against America.‖31  With approval to operate from high ranking Mexican 
officials, and a history of close relationships with local governors in northern Mexico, 
Jahnke had both informal and formal assistance to facilitate his movement back and forth 
across the border.  Jahnke and Witzke, for instance, successfully exploded munitions in 
Richmond, California, destroyed a U.S. tanker outside San Francisco, and destroyed a 
steam schooner in San Pedro, CA. 
While these attacks did not change the course of the war, they were still 
significant.   Not only did they attract the attention of U.S. military and law enforcement 
entities, but they emboldened Berlin to think that German operatives operating out of 
Mexico could strike targets within the U.S. at will and without capture. 
By 1918, Jahnke had risen to become the Chief Secret Agent for Mexico, Central 
America, the U.S., and Canada.  Jahnke controlled a tight-knit group of 15–20 agents in 
Mexico, and an undetermined number elsewhere.  Jahnke‘s agents were mostly German, 
but he also employed Russians, Spaniards and a black Canadian.32  Jahnke did not just 
focus on explosions and acts of terrorism.  His strategy included fomenting unrest among 
minority groups of the military, workers organizations, and other dissident U.S. groups.  
U.S. authorities considered Jahnke the most dangerous man in Mexico with his ability to 
move undetected across the Rio Grande, and given the large and dangerous German 
intelligence network he controlled. 
Despite all these seeming successes, German clandestine efforts in Mexico 
suffered a setback in early 1918.  Traveling with seven other German agents to the U.S. 
on an assassination mission, Witzke was detained by U.S. customs officials after crossing 
                                                 
30 Investigation of Mexican affairs, Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 66
th
 Congress, 459, 462 (1919). 
31 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 105. 
32 Spence, ―German Sabotage,‖ 107. 
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the border at Nogales, AZ.  Five of the German agents escaped detention, but Witzke was 
arrested and U.S. agents found a coded message and cipher table among his belongings.  
The message confirmed the presence of German secret service agents in Mexico.  As it 
turns out, two of Witzke‘s travel companions were undercover double agents.  The 
debrief of these two double agents revealed German plans to instigate racial and labor 
unrest, cause strikes in industrial war supply plants, and blow up mines, industrial plants, 
transportation systems, and communication facilities.33   
Even after Witzke‘s arrest, Jahnke continued his subversive activities, and upon 
orders from Berlin accelerated his campaign to strike strategic U.S. targets, to include the 
Panama Canal.  Jahnke repeatedly traveled back and forth from Mexico to the U.S., 
meeting and plotting with contacts, coordinating for subversive attacks, and attempting to 
recruit Mexican-Americans to assist with German covert operations on both sides of the 
border.  As momentum in Europe shifted against the Germans, however, Berlin‘s focus 
increasingly became survival.  With the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, 
Jahnke and many of his fellow operatives ceased their subversive activities, sought refuge 
in Mexico, and eventually filtered back to Germany and the new Republican government. 
2. Japanese Spies 
If we fast forward to the next world war, what we find are Japanese, rather than 
Germans, making use of Mexico.  Much as the Germans did prior to 1917, the Japanese 
set themselves up just across the border.  The Japanese military sent in operatives from 
Tijuana to collect intelligence on U.S. civil and military activities.  While it is difficult to 
determine whether Mexican authorizes were complicit in these operations or were simply 
unaware of them, it is certain that Japan recognized that the U.S.-Mexico border was 
vulnerable to penetration, and was ideal for gaining illegal and undetected access to the 
U.S. 
In 1934, a young U.S. Customs agent named Carl Eifler was assigned to Tijuana, 
Mexico to gather intelligence on illegal alcohol trafficking to and from the U.S. and 
                                                 
33 David Bisant, ―William Gleaves and the Capture of Lothar Witke,‖ National Security Agency 
Newsletter 47, no. 7 (1999): 5, http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/1999–07.pdf 
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Mexico.  Eifler‘s focus was to identify where alcohol was entering the U.S., determine 
who was behind the illegal alcohol trafficking, and uncover how the illegal alcohol was 
being smuggled.   
In April, as Eifler was seeking information on bootleggers, he casually observed 
three Japanese males enter the bar he was in.  While it was not uncommon to see foreign 
crewmen out for a good time in Mexican ports, the mannerisms, dress, and haircuts of 
these Japanese men made them stand out.  For one, none of them understood or spoke 
Spanish, all were dressed in clothing atypical for the area, and they all carried an air of 
stiffness not usually associated with sailors or merchant seamen.  Instead, they quietly 
gambled and played games in the bar for over an hour, then walked out into the night.  
Sensing something unusual, Eifler trailed the men through a series of twisting dingy 
streets to a small grocery store.   
Eifler spotted small groups of Japanese men in this same bar on other nights.  This 
aroused his curiosity and he determined to find out what they were doing.  He followed 
each group as they left the bar and, without exception, they all took the same winding 
path and disappeared into the same small windowless grocery store.  Utilizing his 
network of informants, Eifler discovered these men were members of the Japanese 
military.  This startling information caused Eifler to launch a month-long investigation.   
The information Eifler compiled was startling:  he identified a base camp 
established just twelve miles from the California border, with its own artesian well and a 
natural airdrome previously utilized by smugglers being used by a task force of over 400 
Japanese Army and Imperial Navy Officers of varying ranks and from different branches 
of service.  A check with Mexican immigration officials revealed no evidence or 
documentation of their presence in Mexico, indicating that the Japanese officers had 
entered the country illegally.34  Because Japanese operatives were moving across the 
U.S.-Mexico border undocumented, they managed to conduct activities without raising 
 
 
                                                 
34 Thomas Moon and Carl Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (New York: Vantage, 1975), 8. 
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the suspicion of border or customs agents. Even more stunning were reports that these 
Japanese military personnel were regularly crossing the border to visit the Long Beach 
and San Pedro naval shipyards.35   
In addition to the Japanese military officers hiding out in Mexico just 12 miles 
from the U.S. border, Eifler also discovered a number of Japanese exchange professors in 
various positions in Mexican universities  and at multiple levels of the Mexican 
government.  While some of these individuals advocated stronger economic ties to Japan, 
others met with high level Mexican officials to discuss Japan‘s intent to go to war with 
the U.S., and the possibility of using land in northern Mexico and southern California 
from which to stage troops and supplies.36  Given this information, Eifler felt certain that 
Japan was planning on war with the U.S. by initially attacking U.S. Navy targets in 
Southern California.   
Despite the unwillingness of Eifler‘s superiors to act on his information, Eifler 
continued to take note of Japanese activity along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Several 
months later, the Japanese government requested authorization to bring Japanese ships 
into Long Beach and San Pedro in order to store and trans-ship prawns from Mexican 
markets to Japan.  This process was not at all uncommon at the time, so even with 
Eifler‘s very detailed report, the U.S. government granted permission for Japanese ships 
to enter the U.S. ports.  Eifler continued to follow the Japanese, noting that all the 
―fishermen‖ conducted themselves with stereotypical military bearing.37 
Whether Eifler‘s report was lost, ignored, or simply not properly processed 
remains a mystery.  Japan had not been antagonistic toward the U.S. up to this point, so 
the presence of Japanese military officers in Tijuana, Mexico may not have seemed 
overly troubling.  In addition, the federal government lacked a mechanism or institution 
to collect and action intelligence from various federal, state, and local law enforcement 
entities.   
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Although Eifler‘s report did not raise much alarm or suspicion, it did circulate 
through the various understaffed intelligence services.  After reading Eifler‘s report, a 
Navy Captain in Pearl Harbor noticed Japanese naval officers putting on civilian clothes 
and boarding U.S. naval vessels under the guise of selling merchandise in 1936.38  At 
least President Roosevelt took seriously these Japanese attempts to gain access and 
collect information on U.S. naval activities.  He informed Secretary of State Stinson he 
had knowledge of a 100 year plan developed by the Japanese in 1889 to defeat the U.S. 
and claim property in the Pacific.39 
Unexpectedly but fortunately, the Japanese threat disappeared almost as suddenly 
as it had appeared.   By the end of 1934 the Japanese seemed to vanish, indicating that 
whatever potential alliance they sought through Mexico failed to materialize.  However, 
even though the immediate threat of Japan crossing through Mexico dissipated, their 
probing shed light on the potential for trouble from south of the border. 
3. Mexico as a Base of Operations 
What these two examples reveal is the proven potential for adversaries of the U.S. 
to use the U.S.-Mexico border to gain undetected entry into the U.S.  With large stretches 
of unguarded territory, the border has long lent itself to smuggling activities in both 
directions.  In the case of Germany‘s clandestine subversion campaign, the porous border 
allowed operatives to move back and forth across the border and conduct attacks on 
targets within the U.S.  In the case of Japan‘s clandestine espionage campaign, the porous 
border allowed operatives to move back and forth across the border to gather information 
regarding civil and military institutions and targets. 
In both instances adversaries were able to establish a base of operations in Mexico 
to facilitate their cross-border operations.  Although I have not found documented 
evidence of support bases on the U.S. side of the border, it is reasonable to assume a 
support network was in place to receive operatives.  This is evidenced in the coded cipher 
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Lothar Witzke was captured with.  The cipher relayed instructions for his reception and 
assistance from German Consular Authorities, implying a support structure hidden within 
German embassies and diplomatic offices in the U.S.   
B. NON-STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL “INFILTRATION” 
1. American Indians 
Not only have state actors exploited vulnerabilities to infiltrate the U.S., but non-
state actors have also found opportunity and advantage in openly crossing into the U.S. 
from Mexico for their own illicit gain.  During the 19th century, the border between the 
U.S. and Mexico was not well defined or secured.  Massive instability within Mexico 
caused by numerous changes of government along with the Mexican Revolution meant 
control and order were up for grabs in the northern territories. Indians, particularly the 
Apache and Comanche, exploited the relatively open and unenforced land border 
between the two countries (or three countries if we include the Republic of Texas).  War 
parties and entire Indian bands moved south into Mexico and back into the U.S. at will, 
and while they did not seek to disrupt the government per se, their open disdain for law 
enforcement and government initiatives made them a significant threat.   
Frequently, bands of Apache and Comanche Indians would sweep through the 
territories of northern Texas and Arizona, killing and plundering other Indian tribes and 
non-Indian settlers alike.  Indian raiders were known to torment, torture, kill, and even 
kidnap men, women, and children.  Often they were bent on destruction or vengeance for 
some depredation against them.  However, pillaging for economic gain, plundering 
horses, and kidnapping settlers for sale as slaves were also common.     
Following the annexation of the territory of Texas and the signing of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the U.S. government faced a significant problem with regard to 
demarcating the new international boundary and dealing with the approximately 160,000 
Indians residing within the territories it had just annexed.  Particularly difficult to deal 
with were the Apache and Comanche.  Unlike other tribes who attempted to assimilate, 
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many Apaches and Comanches learned they could live off the spoils of the chase and 
plunder taken from the inhabitants of both annexed territories and northern Mexico.40 
While Washington was quarreling over the status of slavery, Indian policy in the 
Southwest often depended on the strength and conviction of local authorities.  The central 
Mexican government likewise ―forced‖ local authorities in northern Mexico to have to 
deal with the problem through their own means and resources, claiming the Indian 
problem did not constitute a threat by an external enemy. While Article XI of the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo made it unlawful for anyone living in the U.S. to provide Indians 
with firearms or ammunition, lack of resources made enforcement of this nearly non-
existent.  Making things more difficult were austere environmental conditions, the lack of 
infrastructure on Indian lands, and the presence of both sympathizers and unscrupulous 
traders along the border.  The lack of agreement among federal, state, and military 
authorities created all sorts of exploitable opportunities for the Indians.41   
Indian raiding parties quickly adapted tactics to take advantage of disputes 
preventing U.S. authorities from crossing into Mexico, or Mexican authorities from 
pursuing Indian raiding parties into the U.S.  Living, roaming, and trading throughout 
northern Mexico‘s territories for years, members of the Lipan band of Apache, for 
instance, were highly sought for their expertise and knowledge in navigating the region.  
Comanche raiding parties utilized Lipan Apache guides for information about routes, 
terrain, remote sanctuaries, and watering holes.  The Lipan were also instrumental in 
identifying settlements and ranches which were easy targets or rich with assets to 
plunder.42 Comanche raiding parties used this information to evade Mexican authorities 
who could not pursue them due to a lack of resources and knowledge about the terrain.  
Aware that authorities could not and would not pursue them into the rugged hills, Indian 
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raiders used key ungoverned areas as safe havens.  These sanctuaries allowed Indians to 
recover, prepare, and organize for further attacks on Mexican and U.S. settlements.43  
Kiowa and Comanche raiding parties were also known to evade capture by fleeing to 
designated Indian reservations.   Indian raiding parties regularly crossed below the Red 
River to commit atrocities inside northern Mexico and Texas, only to return to the safe 
haven of government-established reservations where they could not be touched.44  In just 
one year, the Mexican territory of Nuevo Leon, adjacent to Texas, suffered 62 people 
killed, 30 wounded, 16 taken captive, and the theft of over a thousand animals.  Lack of 
agreements to handle reciprocal crossing of the border in order to pursue Indian raiding 
parties further emboldened Indian raiders as far as Yuma, Arizona.45     
The lack of a coherent policy on either side of the border was clearly problematic.  
What compounded local difficulties was the demand for illicit Indian goods.  U.S. and 
Mexican authorities registered complaint after complaint regarding unscrupulous and 
shady traders who not only turned the Indians against the authorities, but exchanged 
firearms and ammunition with them for plunder and captives.  Over time, plundering 
became the Indians‘ chief means of survival.46 
With the end of the Civil War, finally, there were military resources available to 
put to use against the Indians.  Unfortunately, the approach adopted by men like Colonel 
J.M. Chivington and General William Tecumseh Sherman were often brutal and openly 
invited conflict with the Indians.  While most initiatives were designed to push Indians 
onto reservations or designated Indian territories in the west, some campaigns were 
designed to decimate and exterminate as many Indian men, women, and children as 
possible.47  These attacks only invited retaliatory Indian war parties, fueled by the sacred 
need for revenge and vengeance. Further aggression by government troops only ratcheted 
up the violence, creating a self-reinforcing phenomenon and raising the frequency and 
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intensity of violent attacks.  Whereas isolated pitched battles successfully attritted 
warring Indian tribes, the inability of U.S. or Mexican authorities to pursue raiding war 
parties across the border prevented the raiders‘ eradication.   
In 1882, an agreement was reached that finally reduced Indian access to their 
traditional sanctuaries and removed their ability to evade pursuit by law enforcement.  
U.S. and Mexican authorities now had the freedom to pursue raiding parties across the 
border.  This, for instance, is how General George Crook defeated Geronimo and the 
Chiricahua Apaches in 1886.  Following numerous failed attempts to make peace with 
Geronimo, General Crook pursued Geronimo and his band of dissident warriors through 
Texas.  Hotly pursued by General Crook‘s forces, Geronimo and his warriors evaded 
Crook by fleeing into Mexico where they took refuge in their old safe haven in the Sierra 
Madres.  However, this time Captain Crawford, one of Crook‘s men, continued to dog 
Geronimo, overtaking him at Teopa, Mexico.  Here a combination of U.S. and Mexican 
forces forced Geronimo to flee north back across the Rio Grande.  Back in the U.S., 
Geronimo was pursued through the mountains and eventually captured by General 
Nelson Miles in Skeleton Canyon, Arizona.  Working in concert, U.S. and Mexican 
officials were finally successful in attritting depredating Indian bands or driving them to 
relocate upon designated reservations.48 
The ability of the Apache and Comanche Indians to freely traverse the U.S.-
Mexico border is significant as an example of non-state actors exploiting vulnerabilities 
along the border to elude law enforcement for their own gain.  Not only did raiding 
Indian parties sustain themselves off plunder, but they also fed a thriving market for illicit 
goods both north and south of the border.  Stolen and smuggled livestock and human 
trafficking of captives made Indian raiders of the day quite wealthy.  Their ability to 
utilize their knowledge of the terrain to avoid and evade law enforcement ensured their 
success.  Today, non-state actors utilize this same knowledge to avoid and evade law 
enforcement.  Drugs, guns, and illegal immigrants today are akin to the livestock and 
captive slaves of yesterday. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Numerous enhancements have been made to border security since the events 
described in this chapter.  However, the integrity of the border remains an issue that 
should be at the forefront of U.S. national security concerns.  Given these examples, it is 
possible to imagine a scenario in which terrorist operatives might view the U.S.-Mexico 
border much as the Germans, Japanese, or even Apaches and Comanches once did: as a 
means by which to obtain entry into the U.S. undetected by law enforcement authorities. 
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III. PROBLEMS NOW 
―If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one time and 
can smuggle 20 to 30 persons at one time, one can just imagine how easy 
it would be to bring in 2 to 3 terrorists‖ 
Sigifredo Gonzalez, Sheriff, Zapata County, Texas49 
A. IMMIGRATION ORGANIZATION 
1. Foundation 
Although not formally defined until the La Paz Agreement of 1983, the border 
region or the approximately 2,000 miles of border, to include an approximately 63 mile-
long strip on either side, has attracted increasing attention as a target for law enforcement.  
As attention and focus on the border region have grown, border enforcement efforts have 
evolved.   
The history of informal and formal immigration and naturalization enforcement in 
the U.S. goes all the way back to the country‘s fledgling days.  However, it was not until 
1890 that the federal government took ownership of immigration regulation and passed 
the Immigration Act of 1891.  This established a Commissioner of Immigration in the 
Treasury Department.  This office would change names and locations until it officially 
became the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) under the Department of Labor 
in 1933.
50
   The INS moved to the Department of Justice in 1940, where it became the 
primary agency for enforcing laws relating to naturalization, along with preventing and 
deporting individuals who illegally entered or resided in the United States.
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2. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
The INS would grow commensurate with numbers of people illegally entering the 
U.S. and in response to the adverse effects of illegal immigration on communities along 
the border and further inland.  Unprepared for the magnitude of the tasks it would be 
called upon to perform, to both seal off a porous border and provide services for ever 
growing numbers of immigrants, the system bogged down.  The INS proved inconsistent 
in its ability to manage enforcement while also attending to the huge backlog of 
adjudication requests.  With enforcement from the INS lagging, the number of illegal 
immigrants moving into the U.S. mounted.  Compounding these problems were 
increasing public and political pressure to get the INS to be more enforcement-minded.  
Unfortunately, while this was transpiring the budgets for the INS and the Border Patrol 
remained relatively flat.  This meant, as the flow of illegal immigrants grew, the 
capabilities to stop them remained stagnant.  Although the INS budget did more than 
double in 1997, most of the increase in spending went to enforcement initiatives and not 
to processing immigration backlogs.  The INS was also significantly hampered by 
discrepancies between national policy and disastrously under-staffed and thinly operated 
district offices.  By 1997, many called for sweeping overhauls of the INS, with some, 
such as the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, even suggesting abolishing the 
agency.52  As the New York Times put it in 1997, the INS‘s dual job of policeman and 
social worker left the INS exceptionally inept at it most essential tasks, emphasizing 
police work to the detriment of processing legal immigrants.53 
3. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Responding to the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government passed the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which restructured the agencies charged with protecting 
national security.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), and charged it with preventing terrorist attacks within the 
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U.S., reducing vulnerability to terrorism and minimizing the damage and assisting 
recovery efforts in the wake of terrorist attacks.  The creation of the DHS not only 
signified a new focus on terrorism and protectionism, but merged 22 agencies into one 
department.   
This reorganization of assets and capabilities caused the INS to be subsumed 
under the directorate of Border and Transportation Security, partitioning the functions of 
INS into four new agencies.  The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services would 
handle administration of immigration services, such as permanent residence, 
naturalization, and asylum.  The investigative and enforcement responsibilities would fall 
under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), aimed at enforcing 
immigration laws within the U.S.  Finally, INS prevention functions along the borders 
were controlled by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard 
(not really a new agency). CBP integrated customs, immigration, and agricultural 
inspectors to provide a unified ―one face at the border‖ effort.  It is important to note that 
while CBP‘s goal was to integrate enforcement efforts along the U.S. border, the Border 
Patrol remains a distinct unit with its own officers and mission under CBP. 54   
CBP is tasked by the National Border Patrol Strategy to be the authoritative law 
enforcement agency protecting the nation‘s borders and ensuring the U.S. is not 
penetrated by terrorists, unauthorized migrants, human smugglers, human traffickers, 
drug smugglers, or contraband. Under CBP and the reprioritization of capabilities, one of 
the Border Patrol‘s primary missions, to establish and maintain operational control of the 
U.S. border between ports of entry, was expanded to include preventing terrorists and 
terrorism weapons from entering the U.S.  This then also meant an increased focus on 
inhibiting smuggling networks from moving undocumented aliens and drugs across the 
border into the U.S.55 
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B. POLICY 
Illegal immigration has been a target of attention for both Mexican and American 
authorities and governments along the ―border region‖ going all the way back to the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase of 1853.  This formally 
made the territories of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California part of the U.S.  
Mexican authorities attempted to prevent illegal American immigration into its northern 
regions, while American authorities attempted to restrict undocumented migration flows 
and shut down corridors for smuggling.
56
 
1. 1900s–1990s: From Guest Workers to Illegal Immigrants 
Historically, cross-border movement between the southwestern U.S. and northern 
Mexico was largely unregulated and unproblematic.  Most of the population in the 
southwestern states was of Mexican origin, often with families on both sides of the 
border.  This situation lent itself to a high degree of social, cultural, and economic 
interdependence.  Most cross-border traffic revolved around migrants moving back and 
forth to fill demands for cheap labor.  Legal entry was a cumbersome process, whereas 
illegally crossing the border was relatively easy to accomplish.   
World War I ushered in significant changes.  Labor shortages during the war and 
expansion of agriculture throughout the southwest sparked a massive influx of migrant 
workers.  Economic disparity in Mexico following the Mexican Revolution further 
motivated migrants to seek higher paying jobs in the U.S. in order to provide for their 
families in Mexico.  World War I also saw an increase in restrictions on European 
immigration, which in turn turned the U.S.-Mexico border into a lucrative backdoor for 
illegal European immigrants.57   
Mexican immigrants alone accounted for roughly half a million immigrants who 
illegally entered the U.S. during the 1920s.  But then, the Great Depression forced legions 
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of unemployed Americans into low wage jobs; illegal immigration from Mexico dried up.  
With World War II, demand returned, encouraging another wave of legal and illegal 
migrant workers to enter the U.S.   
In the attempt to manage the labor recruitment process for agribusiness, a guest 
worker arrangement called the Bracero Program was instituted and run between 1942 and 
1964.58  The Bracero Program allowed experienced Mexican farm laborers to legally 
work at wages far below comparable American rates, but far above the peasant wages 
many were earning in Mexico.  The Bracero Program turned out to be a boon for 
agribusiness in the southwest, but it also produced two unintended and significant side 
effects.  It established the culturally accepted exploitation of migrant laborers and it 
firmly entrenched the symbiotic relationship between U.S. employers and migrants 
willing to serve as cheap labor.       
In order to avoid exploitative contracts, which some contended bordered on 
legalized slavery, a large number of migrant workers chose to illegally cross the border 
and work under the auspices of the Bracero Program, but without a contractual 
obligation.  Hotly contested and debated, the Bracero Program ended in 1964, and all but 
ensured the institutionalization of illegal cross-border human smuggling to fill U.S. labor 
shortages.59  For example, annual apprehension of illegal immigrants by the INS jumped 
from 23,000 in 1960 to over 345,000 in 1970, even climbing higher than 1,000,000 
apprehensions by 1978.  While undocumented alien movement cannot be definitively 
measured through apprehension statistics, these do reflect a substantial increase in the 
flow.  Or, as one writer summarized it, ―the guest workers of one era became the illegal 
immigrants of the next.‖60 
Despite the increase in illegal migrants, the INS remained limited in its capacity 
to enforce and control the border.  Despite even higher numbers of apprehensions and 
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deportations, migrants continued to try to illegally enter until they were successful. 
Efforts by Border Patrol and the INS were perceived as symbolic and failed to 
significantly deter illegal entry or reentry.  
A series of programs and new agencies through the 1970s and 1980s sought to 
increase cooperation across the border.  Even with increased arrests and prosecutions 
under these initiatives, undocumented migrants and the smuggling networks that moved 
them north remained generally undeterred.  Not until the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 did U.S. policy significantly address illegal immigration.  
IRCA imposed sanctions on employers of illegal immigrants, offered a general 
legalization for certain undocumented aliens already in the U.S., and authorized the 
expansion of the Border Patrol.  While IRCA was intended to satisfy the need for cheap 
labor and inhibit the hiring of illegal workers, it had much the opposite effect.  IRCA not 
only made illegal entry more attractive, since migrants now hoped to obtain a green card 
via the legalization program, but it also increased business for smugglers and those 
producing fraudulent documents.61   
IRCA did lead to expansion of Border Patrol efforts and invigorated a new 
enforcement campaign.  The number of deployable agents was nearly doubled, and they 
were now empowered with new technologies like ground sensors, cameras, and 
helicopters.  The ability to apprehend and detain illegal immigrants rose, but failed to 
keep pace with the desire of migrants to get into the U.S. for green cards or for 
employment.   
2. 90s Initiatives  
Rising concerns over illegal immigration issues led the Border Patrol to 
experiment with a strategy of ―prevention through deterrence.‖  Instead of waiting to 
detect and apprehend illegal aliens inside the U.S., this new strategy aimed to prevent 
illegal crossing at the actual border.  This included the addition of thousands of agents 
along the border, improved infrastructure such as roads, lights, and ten-foot-tall steel 
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fences, the use of remote surveillance cameras with night vision and thermal imaging, 
and the collection of illegal immigrant information in the Automated Biometric 
Identification System (IDENT) database.62 
In 1993, Operation Hold the Line, in El Paso, Texas, represented the first 
application of this experimental strategy.  Border Patrol agents positioned themselves in 
close proximity and in clear view along the Rio Grande River.  The operation was highly 
successful as a deterrent, indicated by a 76% drop in apprehensions along that stretch of 
border.  The apparent success of this operation not only led to its replication along other 
sectors of the border, but ushered in a bona fide policy shift.63   
Following Operation Hold the Line in Texas, CBP chose San Diego for the next 
stage of implementation because its 66 mile portion of the border accounted for 40% of 
the Border Patrol‘s apprehensions.  Launched in 1994, Operation Gatekeeper deployed 
border agents to high visibility fixed positions in a three tiered defense.  Initial 
apprehensions rose but quickly fell, attributed to the deterrent effectiveness of the 
operation.  Despite political debate over Operation Gatekeeper‘s validity, it successfully 
pushed the flood of undocumented aliens east into the barren and inhospitable middle 
ground in Arizona.64  Authorities believed this would deter illegal immigrants from 
attempting to cross such difficult terrain.  It did not.  Proof comes from humanitarian and 
civil liberties groups who vilify the policy, attributing as many as 5,600 migrant deaths to 
the rugged mountains and deserts since Operation Gatekeeper‘s inception in October 
1994.65 
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Following Operations Hold the Line and Gatekeeper, CBP launched successive 
―deterrence‖ operations.  Operation Safeguard was established in the Tucson sector of 
Arizona, where the Border Patrol increased numbers of agents, checkpoints, fences, and 
assets to gain control over high volume trafficking areas.   In 1996, the Nogales area of 
Tucson was the busiest illegal immigrant corridor in Arizona; following Operation 
Safeguard, apprehensions decreased by 30%.66   
3. Post 9/11 Initiatives 
In 2005, DHS launched the Secure Borders Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive 
national multiyear plan to secure America‘s borders and significantly reduce illegal 
immigration.  SBI called for an increase in agents to secure ports of entry and to patrol 
borders, upgrade technologies used to control the border, increase investment in 
infrastructure improvements along the border, enforce immigration laws inside the U.S., 
and expand detention and removal capabilities to eliminate ―catch and release‖ 
practices.67  Increased funding did lead to more detention spaces and additional officers, 
but the most significant result of SBI was the development of the SBInet.  
Launched in 2005, SBInet was designed to be an integrated, comprehensive 
system managed by CBP to maximize state of the art systems and traditional security 
infrastructure in order to make up for shortages of personnel and infrastructure in remote 
areas.  SBInet, or the ―virtual fence,‖ utilized a combination of ground sensors, cell 
towers, remote cameras, and other complicated arrays of technology to detect, identify, 
and swiftly bring a threat to the attention of border officials.  Through SBInet a massive 
amount of new technology was put in place along the southwest border.  However, 
SBInet was also plagued by delays and weakness in detection and data transfer.  
Originally scheduled for operation in eight months, SBInet was ―consistently over 
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budget, behind schedule and simply not delivering the return on investment,‖ according 
to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano as recently as 2011.68 
In 2007, CBP opened the Office of Alien Smuggling Interdiction (ASI) to deter, 
detect, and disrupt illegal migration into the U.S., as well to increase criminal prosecution 
of smugglers and human traffickers. 69 ASI shares information regarding migrant 
smuggling and clandestine terrorist travel not only among CBP agencies, but also works 
in concert with other law enforcement agencies like the Human Smuggling Trafficking 
Center and the National Targeting Center.  ASI actively pursues alien smuggling threats 
through subordinate units such as Passenger Analysis Units, Regional Carrier Liaison 
Groups (RCLG), the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), and the Fraudulent 
Document Analysis Unit.  Of note, the RCLGs are specially trained CBP officers who 
work out of airports and share information among carriers along with immigration 
authorities and other liaisons to coordinate the targeting and identification of inadmissible 
aliens.  Use of advanced targeting techniques and shared intelligence allows RCLGs to 
indentify passengers who are potential security threats prior to them boarding U.S.-bound 
flights from foreign ports of departure.  Even with the ever increasing sophistication of 
those in the fraudulent document industry, increased scrutiny at POEs, such as airports, 
have dramatically increased deterrence for would-be terrorists from Special Interest 
Countries who are less likely now to use traditional ports of entry to gain clandestine 
access to the U.S.70   
In March 2009, Secretary Napolitano launched the Southwest Border Initiative 
(SWI), a series of initiatives designed to enhance border security and increase 
immigration enforcement.  The SWI was an attempt to overcome existing failed 
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programs (e.g., SBInet).  Unlike the one size fits all approach of SBInet, Secretary 
Napolitano and DHS redirected resources previously intended for SBInet to address 
needs unique to individual sectors along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Secretary Napolitano 
announced an additional $600 million in supplemental funds as part of the SWI to 
increase technology, manpower, and infrastructure.  These funds supported an increase of 
1,000 new border patrol agents, 250 ICE agents, and 250 CBP officers at ports of entry; 
they also bought additional technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles, non-intrusive 
inspection equipment at ports of entry, thermal imaging systems, backscatter x-ray units 
and remote video surveillance systems.71 
C. CATCHING 
1. Who’s Really in Control? 
The Office of Border Patrol, under CBP, is the designated federal agency 
responsible for securing the nation‘s borders between ports of entry.72  Despite the 
magnitude of this task, in 2010 the Border Patrol reported it had 873 or 44% of the nearly 
2,000 miles of shared border with Mexico under operational control.73  The Border Patrol 
defines operational control as border miles where the Border Patrol has the ability to 
detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.74   
The Border Patrol classifies security along the border according to five levels, 
reflecting a defense in depth strategy.  ―Operational control‖ covers the top two levels, 
and is distinguished as the ability to deter, detect, and apprehend illegal entries at the 
immediate border (controlled) or after entry up to 100 miles or more inland (managed). 
Below these two levels is the ―monitored level.‖  ―Monitored‖ means that the Border 
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Patrol has a high probability of detecting illegal cross-border activity, but the ability to 
respond can be hampered by inaccessibility of areas or unavailability of resources.  The 
fourth level is ―low level monitored,‖ defined by lack of resources or infrastructure which 
inhibit detection or interdiction of cross-border illegal activity.  Finally, the lowest level 
is ―remote or low activity,‖ meaning the absence of meaningful border control thanks to 
any or all of the above.75 
A closer look at the 873 miles of border under operational control reveals that 
only 15% was controlled, while the remaining 85% was classified as managed.76   
A careful distinction needs to be made when talking about operational control.  
The Border Patrol‘s definition does not actually require agents to have the ability to 
detect and apprehend ‗all‘ illegal entries into the U.S.  In 2009, the Yuma sector, which 
reported operational control for all of its border miles, reported that of the illegal entries it 
knew about half were apprehended, 40% were turned back, and about 10% ―got away.‖ 
While 10% in a sector under complete operational control is significant in its own right, 
two thirds of the remaining 1,120 border miles not under operational control were 
classified at the monitored level.  This implies that for over 1,087 miles of the 
southwestern border, there was an even greater likelihood that much more than 10% ―got 
away.‖  Worse, this still left over 373 miles of border at the low level monitored level.77 
2. Apprehension at the Border 
Increased scrutiny by DHS officials at U.S. and foreign ports of entry and 
departure has undoubtedly deterred or significantly altered the plans of individuals with 
ties to terrorist organizations from traveling to the U.S. through traditional ports of entry.   
Increased enforcement and a drop in numbers in the San Diego sector, for 
instance, has led the Border Patrol in the Organ Pipe National Forrest of Arizona to 
apprehend illegal immigrants all the way from Tijuana, Mexico.  The fact that Mexican 
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immigrants who literally live across the  river from San Diego are willing to travel over 
500 miles to the east reflects their relentless drive to cross, and the changing nature of 
smuggling.  While security is better at San Diego, it has not stopped illegal immigration, 
but simply redirected the stream of illegal crossers to other less fortified areas, like 
Arizona.  For example, from fiscal year 1994 (FY94) to FY03, apprehension numbers in 
the San Diego sector dropped from 450,152 in 1994 to 111,515 in FY03.  Similarly, the 
overall numbers for Texas dropped from 340,611 in 1994 to 297,550 in FY03.  
Meanwhile, the overall numbers for Arizona more than doubled from 160,684 to 404,025 
in FY03.  While California, Arizona and Texas saw a significant surge in numbers 
peaking in FY00, all saw a decrease in numbers following beefed-up border security 
strategies following the 9/11 attacks.  For example, overall apprehensions went from 
979,101 in FY94 to 1,643,679 in FY00, and down to 893,422 in FY03. 78  Yet, as 
enforcement increased in San Diego after 1995, apprehensions and illegal cross-border 
activity steadily increased in Arizona.  Again, Arizona remains the most active sector 
compared to others since 2000.79 
While smugglers have resorted to utilizing more austere sections of the border to 
conduct illegal cross-border activities, they are also utilizing technology to increase their 
chances of success.  As CBP increases its use of technologies and systems, smugglers 
have also gone high-tech.  Smugglers have begun issuing routes, directions, and even 
providing ―cyber-coyote‖ services for illegal border crossers.  Using cell phones in 
concert with numerous spotters, smugglers are able to monitor the border region‘s 
strategic lookout points in order to steer migrants, as well as drug shipments, through the 
desert and away from the authorities.80 
Success in expanding border security and an increased border security presence 
have likely obstructed historic and traditional smuggling routes used to illegally enter the 
                                                 
78 Guerette and Clarke, ―Border Enforcement, Crime, and Deaths,‖ 161–162. 
79 U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses number of apprehensions by Border Patrol as a key 
indicator of progress against illegal immigration.  However, apprehension statistics only reflect the 
percentage of illegal crossers who were actually caught by the Border Patrol. 
80 Marc Lacey, ―Smugglers Guide Illegal Immigrants with Cues Via Cell Phone,‖ New York Times, 
May 9, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/us/09coyotes.html  
 39 
U.S., in turn contributing to the increase in violence against law enforcement officers by 
smugglers.81  No longer content to simply throw rocks at law enforcement agents or flee 
back towards the Mexican border, smugglers are increasingly using firearms against 
officers.  In just two years, two agents were shot and killed while in pursuit of illegal 
smugglers, one in San Diego in 200982 and another in Arizona in 2010.83 Competition 
among the smugglers may also be increasing.  Reports indicate that some Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations have expanded operations and are now specializing in 
smuggling SIAs into the U.S. This new revenue source for cartels and Mexican 
smugglers is likely to only increase their willingness to use violence to secure high cost 
smuggling of special interest illegals.84 Smuggling is not only lucrative for these 
organizations but their continued ability to smuggle proves crucial to establishing and 
reinforcing long-term mutually beneficial arrangements with other criminal and/or terror 
networks.  A 2010 Center of Immigration Studies film investigation, for instance, 
provides evidence of armed guards escorting illegal immigrants and drug couriers along 
trails just outside Nogales, Arizona.  If cartels and smuggling organizations are willing to 
provide armed escorts for drug shipments, why would they not do the same for high 
profile or high paying special interest illegal aliens?85 
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3. Lack of Resources 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the creation of the DHS, border security 
and the southwest border have received considerable attention.  At the end of the day, this 
has translated into an explosive expansion of resources allocated for border security.  The 
number of agents assigned to the Border Patrol alone has more than doubled since 2001, 
from just under 10,000 in 2001 to over 21,000 in 2011.  DHS allocates approximately 
30% from its budget for CBP and ICE, with $11.9 billion appropriated to support border 
security requirements and initiatives. 86 DHS and CBP initiatives born of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and The Border Protection, Anti-
terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 have created numerous new 
entities and offices within CBP.  These have introduced scores of new cutting edge 
technologies, from vehicle scanners and x-rays to remote sensors and cameras, including 
cameras mounted on unmanned aircraft flying along the border.  Unfortunately, even 
with this increased arsenal, border enforcement officials still admit that the southwest 
border is vulnerable to human smuggling. 
Interestingly, competition for resources among the agencies and offices of DHS 
and CBP has probably not affected operations to the same extent as has the expenditure 
of money on under productive and ill-performing programs.  Initiatives such as SBInet 
and other IT intensive initiatives have cost time and money, and arguably distracted more 
than anything else.   
At the same time, simply throwing money at the problem is no kind of answer 
either.  To adequately train and develop border protection agents takes time and careful 
selection.   The assessment, education, field training and assimilation of new officers into 
the force cannot be rushed if the desired result is quality agents.   A 2011 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that weaknesses in maintaining budgeted 
staffing levels came from attrition and lack of officer compliance with procedures.  The 
report attributes this to complacency and a lack of focus, lack of supervisory presence, 
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and lack of training.87  Rushing agents through training may produce more bodies for 
border security agencies, but this does not ensure quality officers who are diligent in their 
tasks or in reporting.  Untrained or improperly screened applicants can also leave the 
force vulnerable to officer corruption. 
Since 2011, at least 127 CBP employees have been arrested on corruption, bribery 
or civil-rights charges, and that number is on the rise.  The increase in cases by 38% from 
FY04 to FY10 is attributable to the hiring boom that more than doubled the size of the 
Border Patrol and CBP.
88 
 An investigation into agent screening during that explosive 
growth revealed that only 1 in 10 agents hired underwent a polygraph test, and of those 
tested at least 60% were deemed unsuitable for patrolling the border.
89
  The possibility 
that agents joined ―with corruption already in mind‖ should be particularly alarming.  In 
fact, this may be more than just a possibility. According to Charles Edwards, Inspector 
General for DHS, criminal organizations have increased efforts to generate ―systematic 
corruption to further alien and drug smuggling, including smuggling of aliens from 
designated Special Interest Countries.‖90  Take customs officer Margarita Crispin; she 
was recruited by a powerful Mexican cartel, and sent through the agency as a mole.  
Crispin was paid $5 million by the cartel to facilitate illegal smuggling in El Paso, Texas 
until her arrest in 2007. 
91
 Despite reforms like the Anti-Border corruption Act of 2010, 
officer corruption continues to be a significant problem with six federal officers arrested 
for corruption in 2011 in Arizona alone.   All too easily, terrorists could be hidden among 
the illegal immigrants allowed into the U.S. by corrupt border officials.  
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While the Border Patrol attempts to develop more agents, the President and the 
DoD have twice in a five year span deployed National Guard troops to the border.  
Beginning in 2006, then-President Bush deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to 
augment CBP offices to assist with the detection of illegal immigrants and drug 
smugglers; their primary role was to assist with infrastructure development in the form of 
roads and fences. Again in 2010, President Obama deployed 1,200 National Guard troops 
to augment CBP officers in detecting illegal immigrants and smugglers.  These temporary 
measures were intended to keep the border secure while 1,000 CBP agents were added to 
the force.92 
The deployment of National Guard troops has received scrutiny from multiple 
stakeholders.  Arizona Senator John McCain has argued that 1,200 troops is not enough, 
calling for the deployment of more than an additional 5,000.  Some criticize the 
government for increasingly militarizing the border and the border region.  Others, like 
some in the DoD, argue that the continued extension of National Guard troops under 
President Obama‘s Operation Phalanx points to the lack of a comprehensive border 
strategy.  If the deployment of troops is designed to bridge the gap while an additional 
1,000 agents are added, one might wonder whether additional agents are the cure, 
especially since the Border Patrol has increased its ranks from 10,000 in 2004 to over 
20,500 at the end of fiscal year 2010.93  Analysts contend that more agents operating at 
the tactical level would not drive border policies. Instead, reform of policies and 
immigration laws must come from Congress.94 
4. Red Tape 
Not only have unsynchronized and ineffective initiatives hampered border 
officials from gaining the upper hand on smuggling networks and illegal immigration, 
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bureaucratic red tape and interagency frictions have likewise prevented border officials 
from applying consistent pressure on smuggling networks and prevented them from 
deterring illegal immigrants.   
Initially, law enforcement officials attempted to keep problems away from their 
own jurisdictions.  More recently, there has been a concerted effort to acknowledge that 
problems along the Mexican border are not isolated, but affect the region as a whole.  
New interagency and joint task forces have sprung up, and are leading the way in 
innovative techniques and uses of information to combat smuggling networks and defeat 
illegal border crossers.  Task forces such as the Border Enforcement Security Task Force 
(BEST) represent a combined effort that includes federal, state, regional, and local 
offices.  BEST teams operate at strategic locations along the border to increase the 
effectiveness of investigations and arrests.  This all-for-one approach, also involving 
Mexican authorities, reduces loopholes smugglers would otherwise exploit, and 
maximizes the use of limited resources across the participating partner organizations.  
Unfortunately, not all task forces and areas are completely synchronized.  Regional and 
localized political pressures, budgetary constraints, and risk aversion still contribute to 
breakdowns and inefficiency among offices.   
A 2009 sampling of 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border 
communities revealed inconsistencies in coordination.  Of the agencies contacted, 15 
reported positive information sharing directly with Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI that 
enhanced their awareness and ability to interdict criminals and potential terrorists.    
However, five of the 20 reported they did not receive information from any federal 
agencies.  Additionally, 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies indicated they did not have 
clear guidance when it came to what federal agencies considered suspicious activities, 
how these should be reported, or who to report them to.  While agencies may have the 
best intent to work together for a common goal, it is vital to establish clear guidelines to 





This is especially true since local communities have the local knowledge the federal 
government needs, while the federal government has robust assets local communities 
cannot match.95  
Red tape can also impede relations between border enforcement agents and land 
owners.  While the Border Patrol is primarily responsible for enforcing border security 
between official ports of entry, it does not own or control any territory.  This presents a 
real challenge since human smugglers do not face similar restrictions or limitations (other 
than inherent risks with terrain and probability of capture).  Nowhere is this more evident 
than on federal lands controlled by the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest 
Service.  Federal lands comprise almost 820 miles, or 43%, of the entire southwestern 
border.96  While the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which controls the Forest 
Service, and DOI employ law enforcement officers, they often to not have the same 
access to resources that CBP agents have.  In federal areas around Tucson (Arizona), for 
instance, Border Patrol estimates from FY09 indicate apprehensions did not keep pace 
with the estimated number of illegal entries.  The Border Patrol estimated that close to 
three times more aliens illegally entered the U.S. through federal lands than the 91,000 
who were apprehended.97 
In 2006, DHS, DOI, and the USDA signed a joint memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) and established the Public Lands Liaison Agent program to establish a 
coordinated and cooperative interagency effort.  Since signing the joint agreement, 
successive MOUs and task forces have been established to deal with specific smuggling 
threats across federal land along the border. 
While these MOUs and joint task forces have led to increased apprehensions, 
bureaucratic red tape has hindered operations in certain areas.  For instance, to comply 
with the Wilderness Act of 1964, National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, National 
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Border 
Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from the appropriate federal land management 
agency to conduct certain activities.98  Over half (or 17 of 26) of the Border Patrol 
stations with jurisdiction for federal lands along the southwestern border have 
experienced delays and restrictions in patrolling and monitoring due to various land 
management stipulations.  Most of these 17 stations report that, despite frustrating 
backlogs and delays, land management laws did not drastically change their sector‘s 
border security status.  However, four stations did acknowledge that delays and 
restrictions reduced their ability to achieve or maintain operational control of their 
sectors, and lessened their ability to detect and apprehend illegal aliens.99   
Certain Border Patrol stations patrolling federal lands in Arizona report that it 
regularly takes several months to obtain permission from federal land managers to 
reposition or establish mobile surveillance systems.  In one instance, a Border Patrol 
request was delayed by more than four months thanks to environmental and historic 
property assessments required by federal land management laws.  During those four 
months, Border Patrol surveillance systems had limited ability to monitor an area to 
which illegal traffic had shifted before the request was approved.100 
In New Mexico, four stations reported delays of six months or more before they 
obtained permission to maintain or improve roads.  In one instance it took nearly eight 
months to receive a permit to improve a road allowing trucks to reposition underground 
sensors.  This meant that for eight months agents could not monitor the area with 
surveillance equipment and could not utilize vehicles to patrol the area which was known 
to be used by illegal aliens.101 
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In one instance, an Arizona federal land manager refused a Border Patrol request 
because the proposed site was in a designated wilderness area.  The Border Patrol asked 
to place an SBInet tower within the Organ Pipe wilderness area, which would enable 
agents to detect undocumented aliens within a 30 square mile range.  Denied this 
preferred location, the Border Patrol established the tower on Arizona state owned land 
instead.  Unfortunately, the new site had a smaller surveillance range, resulting in three 
miles the tower could not cover in an area known for undocumented alien traffic.  
Additionally, thanks to the tower‘s placement, agents now have less time in which to 
react and apprehend illegal border crossers before they reach mountain passes where it is 
easier for them to avoid detection.102 
Whereas federal land management laws may inhibit select stations from operating 
at their peak capacity, the primary factor that affects operational control on federal 
borderlands is remote and rugged terrain.  Specifically, dense vegetation, rocky 
mountains, and deep canyons affect agents‘ ability to detect and apprehend 
undocumented aliens.  Technologies designed to work in desert environments are 
frequently thwarted by undulating terrain and deep canyons.  Terrain limits the ability to 
leverage vehicle and helicopter assets.  Agents are often reduced to chasing groups of 
people on foot over rugged terrain and through dense vegetation, well after technologies 
have detected them.   
Other problems cited by Border Patrol officers are insufficient resources, the 
distance of resources from border areas, and operational gaps between stations and 
sectors.  Additional technology resources, such as mobile surveillance systems, would 
likely increase detection capabilities and augment fixed location surveillance 
technologies.  Some stations may be as much as 100 miles away from the areas they are 
responsible for covering.  The location of stations also affects boundaries, especially 
where some federal lands overlap Border Patrol sector boundaries.  A GAO report found 
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these boundaries and seams were sometimes under-patrolled, leading to lower levels of 
apprehension and higher levels of illegal cross-border activity.103 
5. Lack of Confidence in ICE Leadership/Policy 
Another area of significant concern is the dissension and lack of unity among 
federal immigration officers.  In June 2010, the National Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Council, representing over 7,000 ICE officers and agents from the 
Enforcement and Removal Operations office within ICE, cast a unanimous vote of ―No 
Confidence‖ in John Morton, Director of ICE, and Phyllis Coven, Assistant Director of 
ICE Office of Detention Policy and Planning.  Their dissatisfaction stems from concerns 
that Director Morton and Assistant Director Coven are campaigning for amnesty-related 
immigration reforms instead of trying to secure additional resources and manpower to 
alleviate ICE‘s current overwhelming burdens.  One explanation for the vote of no 
confidence: ―ICE has virtually no consistent national policies … operations suffer, 
accountability is nonexistent, and ICE is unable to perform at its potential.‖104 
This no confidence vote also highlights vulnerabilities in the system related to 
discrepancies between federal and local law enforcement.  State and local law 
enforcement agencies and jails are overwhelmed, and without sufficient resources are 
unable to prosecute or detain illegal immigrants.  Often, illegal immigrants and criminal 
aliens are released back into local communities before ICE can be summoned.  Much as 
with ―catch and release‖ polices of the past, these problems with the detention and 
prosecution of illegal immigrants results in many illegal and criminal aliens being 
released on their own recognizance.   In this environment, potentially overworked and 
undertrained state and local law enforcement officers can all too easily underestimate the 
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potential threat from a terrorist operative posing as an illegal immigrant, especially 
should such individuals utilize sophisticated methods to conceal their true identities and 
countries of origin. 
Recent passage of stricter immigration enforcement legislation in Arizona further 
draws attention to deficiencies between federal and local law enforcement authorities.  In 
May 2010, Director Morton declared that ICE would not necessarily process illegal 
immigrants referred to it by Arizona law enforcement officials.  Director Morton cited the 
President‘s and DHS‘s distaste for the controversial Arizona law which criminalizes all 
illegal aliens.  Director Morton claimed illegal immigration should be handled through a 
comprehensive federal approach, and not a conglomeration of individual state laws.  
Despite the fact that state border apprehensions were up 6% in Arizona during the fall of 
2010, Senator Jeff Sessions pointed out ―they‘re [Morton and DHS] telegraphing to every 
ICE agency in America that they really don‘t intend on cooperating with Arizona.‖  
Without support from ICE and other federal DHS agencies, it is difficult to estimate how 
long states like Arizona can continue to detain and process the large number of illegal 
immigrants in their communities‘ systems.105   
D. DETENTION 
1. Catch and Release 
Other states, beyond Arizona, may also decide to take matters into their own 
hands soon.  In 2004, the Bush administration was under considerable pressure to reform 
immigration policy that was not only weak but potentially compromising for national 
security.  The primary source of friction surrounded what was referred to as ―catch and 
release‖ immigration practices.  The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 legislation generally mandated detention for illegal 
immigrants since most illegal aliens flee instead of appearing for scheduled immigration 
hearings.  Undocumented aliens from Mexico were typically processed and returned to 
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Mexico, often within hours of their apprehension.  Undocumented aliens from countries 
other than Mexico (OTM) could not be returned to Mexico, despite the fact they arrived 
into the U.S. illegally through Mexico.  Because OTM illegal aliens could not be returned 
to Mexico, they had to be detained until immigration proceedings could determine how to 
return them to their country of origin.  Additionally, illegal OTM aliens could apply for 
asylum since many were from war-torn and unstable countries where they faced 
persecution or death upon return.  With the large number of Mexican and OTM asylum 
cases, a backlog resulted in overcrowded detention facilities.  To alleviate the strain on 
detention facilities, OTMs who posed no discernible threat to national security were 
released on their own recognizance with a notice to appear at a scheduled immigration 
court hearing several weeks to months later. While most OTM aliens consisted of Central 
and South American migrants, a significant percentage also included Aliens from Special 
Interest Countries (ASIC).  However, in many cases, there were no files or records of 
misconduct or intent on hand for these OTMs from Special Interest Countries.  Because 
they were not deemed a security threat, they were then released into the public through 
the immigration court system. 
As many as 70% of the approximate 155,000 undocumented OTM aliens 
apprehended were released in 2005.106 For certain areas the figures were even higher.  
McAllen, Texas released as many as 90% of the OTM illegal aliens apprehended in its 
sector in 2005.  The 2005 CRS Report, Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens, 
found that only up to 30% of  OTM illegal aliens who received notices to appear before 
an immigration judge for asylum hearings actually showed up. 107  This meant that in 
addition to the numbers of undocumented aliens who successfully entered the U.S. 
without being caught by law enforcement, an estimated additional 76,000 illegal aliens 
were roaming the interior of the U.S. in 2005 alone.  Many of these individuals remain 
uncaught or beyond the purview of law enforcement until they commit an offense or are 
detained by local law enforcement in cases unrelated to immigration.  This often takes 
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place well north of the border, placing an undue burden on communities beyond the 
border region.  The security implication, of course, is that OTM illegal immigrants 
awaiting immigration hearings remain free to conduct activities so long as they do not 
attract law enforcement attention. 
2. Reform 
In 2005, Michael Chertoff, then Secretary of DHS, announced the end of ―catch 
and release‖ immigration policies.  Chertoff went on to declare he would remove, detain, 
and deport every illegal immigrant caught coming across the border.  Secretary 
Chertoff‘s immigration reform focused on increasing the detention capacity for OTM 
aliens under the Secure Border Initiative and on expanding the use of the expedited 
removal process.  Under expedited removal, undocumented aliens are initially screened 
and designated for deportation without a hearing before an immigration judge.  Not only 
did these reforms facilitate faster turnover and greater utilization of detention capacity, 
they were also intended to deter OTM aliens from attempting to cross the border 
illegally.108 
Secretary Chertoff and DHS considered these reforms a success in 2006, 
effectively declaring the end of ―catch and release.‖  Detention of undocumented OTM 
aliens rose sharply from only 34% in 2005 to approximately 99%.109 Under the expedited 
removal process, detainees were deported at an average of 19 days after capture in 
contrast to the previous average of 90 days.110   
Other targeted initiatives, such as Operation Streamline, attempted to increase 
deterrence for would-be illegal border crossers.  Under Operation Streamline, border 
security officials and law enforcement would prosecute all illegal border crossers on 
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federal criminal charges.  This would make any illegal border crosser subject to prison 
time ranging from a few months for first time offenders up to 20 years for repeat 
offenders.  
3. Unintended Consequences 
In retrospect, what Secretary Chertoff failed to recognize is that while ―catch and 
release‖ policies may have ended, increased apprehensions required more expedited trials 
and increased detention by state and local officials.  Unfortunately, the money and 
resources directed towards ICE and the expansion of its detention centers did not always 
alleviate the burden placed on state and local detention capabilities.  Too often state and 
local dockets have been overwhelmed by illegal immigration cases, and detention centers 
are full of all sorts of cases involving illegal immigrants, from misdemeanors to felonies.  
Understandably, state and local jurisdictions try to process and move illegal immigrants 
to federal ICE facilities as soon as possible.   
Following an initial expansion of almost 10,000 bed spaces in 2006, ICE has 
continued to expand its detention capabilities to over 32,000 spread throughout 350 local 
jails, state prisons, and contract facilities. 111 As ICE fills its limited detention capacity, 
however, it must inevitably utilize overcrowded state and local detention centers to either 
house or release illegal aliens back into the community.  ICE pays $100 a day for bed 
space to state and local agencies.  But this does not always compensate them for the 
additional burdens placed on interpreters, prison officials, and the state and local 
facilities.  Much as with the ―catch and release‖ practices of the early 2000s, what 
happens is overworked state and local law enforcement agencies inadvertently allow 
seemingly non-violent or non-threatening illegal aliens access into the interior of the U.S. 
with only a notice to return for trial. 
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4. Shift in 287(g) Program 
According to Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, state and local law enforcement personnel can be deputized 
to conduct specific immigration enforcement function through ICE.  ICE can thereby 
leverage local law enforcement capabilities to expand its efforts and broaden the scope 
and range of its enforcement activities.  As of 2010, ICE had 71 agreements in 26 states, 
greatly expanding its capabilities.112  For example, in 2007 the 287(g) program accounted 
for about 20% of all criminal alien arrests by ICE authorities.  However, the success of 
this program has led to other problems, specifically with limited numbers of detention 
beds and removal officers.  Increased efficiency in apprehending and detaining illegal 
aliens, combined with a bottleneck in judicial immigration hearings, has overwhelmed 
the resources of state and local detention facilities, again forcing them to release all but 
the most violent or threatening detainees. 
In June 2009, for instance, ICE issued a directive to one of its most productive 
287(g) partners to stop detaining large numbers of apprehended undocumented aliens and 
to release them into the community on their own recognizance.  In an attempt not to 
exceed bed space detention capacity, ICE was hoping to avoid overcrowding or 
exceeding detention capacity with minor offenders.  While ICE helped to ensure violent 
criminal illegal aliens were not released back onto the streets, undocumented aliens with 
no known criminal history were, by definition, considered non-threatening.113 This 
means that if terrorists were to game the system, an undocumented terrorist operative 
with no known history to local law enforcement could be released into the interior of the 
U.S. to make room for violent and criminal illegal aliens in jail.  
To prevent overcrowding or exceeding capacity, ICE Director Morton released a 
new directive in 2011 to focus enforcement priorities.  The memo specifically deals with 
the practice of prosecutorial discretion, or the authority granted to immigration 
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enforcement entities to selectively decide to what degree they want to enforce the law 
against a particular individual.114  As everyone‘s priorities shifted to removing violent 
criminal aliens from communities and to enforcing workplace compliance, this sidelined 
other immigration-related issues.  What were concerns post-9/11 over undocumented 
aliens from Special Interest Countries appear today to be taking a back seat to public and 
political pressures to remove criminal aliens from local communities.   Often referred to 
as the new ―catch and release,‖ this directive which was designed to ease the burden on 
prosecutorial and detention facilities now places communities at risk in a different way.   
Under prosecutorial discretion, immigration enforcement officers can deem that 
aliens who hail from Special Interest Countries and are seeking asylum, and who have no 
previous record, should be released on their own recognizance for later immigration 
hearings.  In this way, an unknown terrorist operative with no history of illicit activity 
may slip through the cracks.  This is especially likely when untrained, over-worked, and 
unsuspecting state and local authorities are hard pressed to deal with already proven 
criminals.   
While this erosion of comprehensive and uniform immigration enforcement 
policies does not ensure immediate catastrophic failure, it does create critical 
vulnerabilities and loopholes potential terrorists can pursue.  As Janice Kephart from the 
Center for Immigration Studies writes:  
The following terrorists applied for asylum, were released pending their 
hearings, and used their freedom to commit or attempt to commit terrorist 
acts. 
- Mir Aimal Kansi murdered two CIA employees 
- Ramzi Yousef masterminded the first Word Trade Center attack 
- Shahawar Matin Siraj was arrested for plotting to bomb a subway station 
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- Sheik Umar Abd ar-Rahman plotted to bomb New York City landmarks 
- Hesham Mohamed Hadayet shot and killed two people in Los Angeles115 
E. TRUTH BEHIND LOWER NUMBERS 
In sum, increased success at traditional ports of entry and sector by sector 
successes in areas like Yuma and San Diego have pushed human smugglers to more 
austere locations.  While these locations lead to higher risk of death and a lower 
probability of success, they also represent a lower probability of detection and 
apprehension by law enforcement due to the lack of border security resources in these 
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IV. CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
―Either to recruit, provide more funding or serve as operatives or sleepers 
for some future activity.‖ 
Joan Neuhaus Schaan, expert on Homeland Security and Terrorism and 
Fellow at Rice University Baker Institute116 
A. THE THREAT 
Increasing scrutiny by DHS agencies and ever increasing sophistication with 
border screening technology (such as CBP IDENT biometric system, Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the FBI‘s Next Generation 
Identification System (NGI)) is causing terrorists seeking to stay off law enforcement‘s 
radar to veer away from traditional ports of entry.  Though it may be no safer or easier, 
clandestinely entering the U.S. by sneaking across the border could be worth anonymity.  
Several cases challenge the claim that terrorists do not seek to move operatives 
across the U.S.-Mexico border through clandestine trafficking networks.  My review of 
these cases is not designed to concentrate on what is being smuggled, but to illustrate 
what established smuggling networks have the potential to do.  These individuals and 
networks represent the threat, moving people from Special Interest Countries with known 
associations with terrorism, through Mexico into the U.S., and assimilating them into 
diaspora communities or populations which allow them to hide in plain sight.  In some 
cases, individuals directly tied to terror organizations have been smuggled into the U.S., 
while in other cases individuals with suspected ties to terrorist organizations were simply 
smuggled over the border.  In either instance, it is the demonstrated success and potential 
for future repeat performance that poses the most significant and credible threat.   
Perhaps of even greater danger or concern is the potential roles terrorist operatives 
could play once they enter the U.S. clandestinely.  While there is already attention paid to 
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the idea that suicide bombers inspired by and working with an extreme or fundamentalist 
terror organization could come across the border and hit American targets, the prospect of 
recruiters crossing the border into the U.S. undetected is much more frightening.  While 
a single suicide bomber could certainly wreak havoc on a grand scale in one attack, a 
recruiter can radicalize scores of potential suicide bombers.  Of ever greater concern is 
that while this potential recruiter might himself be an illegal immigrant, forced to live off 
the grid and take measures to maintain a low to invisible profile, those he recruits would 
be U.S. citizens.  Imagine radicalized citizens with no prior criminal record, free to 
operate in the open without drawing any attention from law enforcement.  For instance, 
an illegal immigrant operating as a recruiter must traffic in prepaid phones, hand write 
correspondence, deal in cash, travel by privately owned vehicle, use fraudulent papers, 
develop and maintain cover, etc.  In contrast, a radicalized U.S. citizen can have multiple 
cell phones, use e-mail and online applications, own credit cards, fly on a plane, rent/buy 
cars or other equipment, rent a home, pass through a road block unworried, etc.    
A recent study by the New York State Intelligence Center points to the dangers 
potential radicalized U.S. citizens can pose.  The study examined major terrorism cases in 
the U.S. since September 11, 2001.  In a review of 32 cases resulting in federal terrorism 
charges and arrests, the Center identified 90 individuals and discovered some alarming 
trends.  Of the 90 individuals arrested, 50 were U.S. citizens at the time of their arrest.  
Of those 50 U.S. citizens, 35 were born in the U.S.117  The study found that many 
members of the same group were born or lived in the same community, concluding that 
cells formed more easily when members lived and interacted among those like them.  In 
just 11 cases taking place from 2009 to 2010, 10 of the 19 individuals arrested were 
natural born U.S. citizens.118  The study concluded that the threat from ―homegrown‖ 
terrorism is very real and will continue to pose a challenge to law enforcement.  Of note, 
over half (56%) of the individuals involved in the cases had no previous contact with law 
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enforcement prior to their planning or participation in attempted terrorism attacks.119  
Their absence from law enforcement databases makes identification and countering 
would-be terrorists incredibly difficult, especially during the planning and pre-operational 
phases of terrorist attacks. 
While the motivation for smuggling humans into the U.S. may vary among 
groups, the demonstrated ability of groups to move significant numbers of humans across 
the U.S.-Mexico border undetected suggests a real vulnerability.  Terrorists and terror 
organizations already have links into some communities.  At the same time, however, one 
must not see terrorists in every ethnic group whose homeland has some form of 
insurgent, nationalist, or domestic terror movement.   However, we also cannot be 
complacent; many of these domestic movements also serve as the springboard for the 
nexus between domestic terror-fundamentalist groups and transnational criminal 
organizations with overlapping ideologies or financial systems. 
B. CASES 
1. Al Shabaab 
Somalis represent an interesting case, as they represent not only a diaspora with 
recognized refuge and asylum issues, but one with ties to a designated terrorist group.  
While many Somalis are law abiding residents hoping to escape the strife and upheaval in 
Somalia, other Somalis are deeply entwined in the network of Al Shabaab (sp).   
In 2008, the U.S. officially designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist.  Al Shabaab is a decentralized 
group, with members coming from disparate clans.  Al Shabaab briefly took over most of 
southern Somalia in 2006, but since has been reduced to a violent insurgency in southern 
and central Somalia.    Al Shabaab is responsible for many attacks within Somalia, and 
one suspected suicide bombing in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup.  The primary 
focus of Al Shabaab remains to overthrow the Somali government and impose Sharia or 
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Islamic law within Somalia.  However, in 2010 Al Shabaab formally aligned itself with 
Al Qaeda, and declared its own intent to cause harm to the U.S.120 
Since 2007, more than 40 Americans have joined Al Shabaab‘s ranks and 
conducted violence on its behalf.  Of these confirmed 40 radicalized American citizens, 
15 have died fighting with Al Shabaab.  This number represents the most Americans that 
have been killed while fighting with any other foreign terrorist group.  Another 
particularly dark note, is that the first confirmed American suicide bomber was a 
Minnesota resident who radicalized and joined Al Shabaab before blowing himself up in 
an attack in northern Somalia.121  Raised in Minneapolis, Shirwa Ahmed, 27, left the 
Minneapolis area for Somalia with other Somali youth, and eventually drove a car loaded 
with explosives into a government compound in October 2008.122  Another first: Daniel 
Maldonado is the first U.S. born American citizen ever convicted of receiving military 
training from a terrorist organization.  Leaving a wife and three children in Houston in 
2005, Maldonado trained with Al Shabaab on firearms and Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) and bomb building.  Maldonado was captured fleeing Somalia by Kenyan 
authorities in 2007, turned over to U.S. custody, and sentenced to 10 years in prison.  
Like Maldonado, two other U.S. citizens have been prosecuted for fighting the jihad in 
Somalia.  Transcripts from Maldonado‘s interrogation provide a chilling warning for the 
future, ―[Al] Shabaab is not only intent upon creating an army of extremists for a crusade 
against the West, but it also seeks to establish an extremist Islamic network of unrivaled 
strength.‖ 123 
In February 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy of Virginia was arrested for his alleged 
participation in an international human trafficking ring designed to bring Somalis from 
Somalia across the Mexican border into the U.S.  Tracy admitted to U.S. authorities that 
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he assisted approximately 272 individuals in moving from Somalia illegally into the U.S.  
Tracy, a U.S. citizen, converted to Islam in prison and began traveling overseas in 2008.  
In 2009 Tracy established Noor Services Limited, a travel business in Kenya which 
provided fraudulent travel visas for Somalis traveling to Cuba and eventually on to the 
U.S.  Tracy claimed he procured fraudulent paperwork for up to ten people a week, 
charging fees ranging from $100 up to $1,000.  Tracy told authorities that he was 
approached by Al Shabaab for assistance with human smuggling in Kenya.  Tracy denied 
any overt cooperation with Al Shabaab, but admitted his clientele was a mix of good and 
bad Somalis.    
Although Tracy was unable to provide information about the 272 illegal Somali 
aliens who remain at large within the U.S., authorities successfully located at least five 
Somali men and women Tracy helped.  Of particular note is that these five men and 
women were found spread throughout the country, living as far apart as New York, 
Tennessee, North Carolina, Washington, and Arizona.  This dispersion of just five men 
and women illustrates the daunting task law enforcement has in finding and apprehending 
individuals who do not show up on their radar.  With that in mind it is worth noting that 
these five individuals were discovered through the social networking site Facebook.  Had 
these five individuals not made themselves available to the world wide web, they might 
had eluded apprehension indefinitely, as have their fellow 267 Somali brethren smuggled 
into the U.S. with Tracy‘s assistance.124 
Another prolific individual involved with smuggling Somalis is Ahmed 
Muhammed Dhakane.  Dhakane was detained by ICE authorities entering the U.S. from 
Mexico in 2008, and was taken into custody by officials under suspicion for his role in a 
large scale human smuggling enterprise, despite his application for asylum.  Originally 
serving as a ―Hawaladar‖ (a director of money exchange for the illegal Hawala banking 
system), Dhakane supported Al Barakat‘s illegal financial activities from 1997–2002.  
Dhakane also worked for Al Ittihad Al Islami (AIAI), another money transfer entity 
associated with funding Al Shabaab through financial contributions from the Somali 
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diaspora.  Both Al Barakat and AIAI are listed by U.S. authorities as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists, and are suspected for financing and supporting terrorism.   
Later, Dhakane established himself as a human smuggler in Brazil from 2006–
2008.  Dhakane was primarily responsible for obtaining fraudulent travel documents in 
order to move Somalis and other East Africans into the U.S.  In addition to providing 
falsified papers, Dhakane taught clients how to make false asylum claims if they were 
captured.  Dhakane was caught on tape boasting that he made as much as $75,000 in one 
day smuggling Somalis, many of whom were members of AIAI and the Islamic Courts 
Union.  Alarmingly, Dhakane openly admitted to knowingly smuggling violent jihadists 
into the U.S., knowing full well they would, when ordered to, commit violent acts within 
the U.S.  It is unknown just how many hundreds of individuals Dhakane helped smuggle 
into the U.S., but it is especially disturbing that violent and radical extremists have 
entered the U.S. untraceable by law enforcement.125   
Dhakane did provide the name of five clients, three of whom are known to be at 
large within the U.S.:  Adani, a supporter of the Islamic Courts Union, Ereg, an AIAI 
member, and Abirizak, a low level operative for the Islamic Courts Union.126 
While officials within the DHS and the Department of State (DoS) publically say 
that terrorists have neither physically crossed nor actively seek to cross the border into 
the U.S., a Homeland Security alert implies the opposite.  In May 2010, DHS issued a 
security alert to Texas authorities to be on the lookout for Somali citizen Mohamed Ali.  
Ali is a suspected member of Al Shabaab, and was believed to be in Mexico preparing for 
the journey to illegally cross into the U.S.  Ali was not apprehended by U.S. or Mexican 
authorities.  The alert is still a reminder that terrorists do seek to use the U.S.-Mexico 
border to infiltrate the U.S.127   
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As previously stated, Al Shabaab‘s primary aim is to unseat the government of 
Somalia.  So, why be concerned over Al Shabaab‘s attempts to clandestinely bring 
terrorist operatives into the U.S. undetected by law enforcement?  Because, while law 
enforcement measures have proven successful thus far in preventing another large scale 
catastrophic attack like September 11, 2001, the development of radical jihadi cells 
within the U.S. is on the rise.  Somali American citizens are being radicalized.  Al 
Shabaab recruitment efforts within the U.S. are prevalent on-line and among Somali 
diaspora communities.  This in no way implies that all or any particular Somali diaspora 
community is a breeding ground for Al Shabaab or any dissident radical Islamic 
movement.  Still, Al Shabaab directly targets many second and third generation youth 
within these communities.  Many youth have trouble assimilating for a variety of reasons: 
low availability of jobs, Somali xenophobia, the growing gap between Islam and 
Christianity within the U.S., the U.S.‘s policies toward Somalia and Ethiopia, prevalence 
of radical/fundamental propaganda on the Internet, etc.  Factors such as these contribute 
to making Somali youth susceptible to the radical ideology of Al Shabaab and other 
terrorist organizations.  
Once again, undocumented illegal aliens with ties to terrorism pose a major 
danger when it comes to their ability to operate as recruiters.  Commonly referred to as 
―homegrown terrorists,‖ as many as 40 radicalized Somali youth were contacted and 
cultivated by recruiters working in the U.S. to raise awareness and funds and find recruits 
for Al Shabaab.  Some speculate that economic disparity creates an underclass among 
ethnic Somali youth, driving them to gangs, drugs, and leaving them susceptible to 
brainwashing.  As parents attempt to steer their children into religious youth programs as 
a counter, they may be inadvertently pushing them right into the situation they are trying 
to avoid.  Abdiweli Ali, an associate professor of economics at Niagra University and 
former adviser to the Somali Transitional Government, argues that young Somalis are 
being targeted for indoctrination and are highly susceptible to the influences of rogue 
imams who instruct youth on misleading and distorted philosophies.128  Another 
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disturbing fact is that not all Somali youth radicalized and fighting for Al Shabaab have 
come from underprivileged situations.  While some radicalized Somali youth from the 
Minneapolis area were alleged gang members, others were intelligent college students 
with positive employment prospects.  Additionally, the 40 known radicalized Somali U.S. 
citizens may only reflect a portion of the actual number, given that Somali families may 
not report the disappearance of youth, especially if they suspect that connections with Al 
Shabaab or terrorist groups may bring unwanted pressure on their family or their 
community.   
In 2009, the FBI in Minnesota conducted Operation Rhino, an investigation 
specifically designed to uncover the disappearance of Somali-American youth from 
Minneapolis fighting with Al Shabaab in Somalia.  Operation Rhino resulted in charges 
against 14 men, with six pleas of guilty for recruiting Somali immigrants and Somali-
American citizens to fight with Al Shabaab.  Federal prosecutors charged the men with 
running an organized network designed to recruit Somali youth and finance their travels 
to Somalia to become fighters for Al Shabaab.  The group is believed to have 
successfully recruited and financed at least 20 Somali youth fighting among Al Shabaab‘s 
ranks, five of whom have been killed while fighting in Somalia.  Originally meeting and 
screening potential youth recruits in public mosques and restaurants, elders and peers 
later led them to secret meetings at private residences in the Minneapolis area.  Here 
recruiters convinced American Somali youth to join the jihad in Somalia.  Veteran Al 
Shabaab fighters like Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax encouraged young men to experience 
―true brotherhood‖ and recounted tales of being wounded, telling Somali youth that ―to 
fight in the jihad will be fun.‖129  Others such as Abdiweli Yassin Isse raised money to 
send young men to Somalia under the guise of studying the Quran in Middle Eastern 
countries.  Ironically, both Faarax and Isse fled from the U.S. across the Mexican border 
near San Diego and are still at large outside the U.S.130   
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Actions within the Minneapolis area are of particular note because Minneapolis is 
home to the largest Somali community in the U.S.  Somali refugees began arriving in the 
U.S. in the early 1990s, fleeing the ongoing civil war.  Many began settling in eastern 
Minneapolis in an area many refer to as ―Little Mogadishu.‖  But, radicalization and 
recruitment are also not limited to Somali youth.  At least three African-Americans from 
the Minneapolis area have reportedly left the U.S. to join in the jihadi fight in Somalia.  
Of particular note is the radicalization and rise in notoriety within Al Shabaab of a 
Caucasian recruit.  Omar Hammami was born in the sleepy suburban town of Daphne, 
Alabama, but now goes by the name Abu Mansour al-Amriki or ―The American.‖  
Hammami went from being a typical goofy American teenager to become a ranking 
commander fighting with Al Shabaab in Somalia.  In addition to being a high ranking 
official, Hammami is an icon for Al Shabaab‘s outreach initiatives and Al Qaeda online 
propaganda videos.  Hammami has become one of the most outspoken voices of Al 
Shabaab, and remains in Somalia fighting and training new Al Shabaab recruits.131 
With over 45,000 Somalis, Columbus, Ohio is home to the second largest Somali 
diaspora in the U.S.132  While the targeted recruitment of Somali youth in Minneapolis 
has been much more prolific, security analysts believe Al Shabaab has successfully 
recruited young men from Columbus to also fight in Somalia.  The 2010 federal 
indictment charging 14 Minnesota men included the identification of an unindicted 
conspirator from Columbus, Ohio.133  Another notable case involves Nuradin Abdi, a 
Somali national living in Columbus, Ohio, who was sentenced to ten years in prison for 
providing support to a terrorist organization.134  Abdi‘s indictment indicated he intended 
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to provide Al Qadea support in the form of recruits and currency.  Additionally, Abdi was 
charged with falsifying travel documents to conceal his travel to Africa for ―jihadi 
training,‖ training Adbi obtained ―to ready himself to participate in violent Jihadi 
conflicts overseas and any activities his al Qadea co-conspirators might ask him to 
perform here in the United States.‖135  Abdi and as many as nine others made up a small 
Al Shabaab-Al Qaeda support cell in the Columbus area.  Co-conspirator Christopher 
Paul, an Ohio native and Muslim convert, was also arrested and indicted for his role in 
providing material support to a terrorist organization, training terrorists to conduct 
bombing attacks overseas, and conspiring to blow up a central Ohio shopping mall.136  
Iyman Faris, a Pakistani truck driver was also arrested and sentenced as a co-conspirator 
with Abdi and Pual.  Faris was sentenced to 20 years in prison for providing material 
support to terrorists and his ties to Al Qaeda.137 More recently, in September 2010, a high 
level Al Shabaab commander killed during fighting with Somali government troops in 
Mogadishu was discovered to be 35-year-old Dahir Gurey, a resident of Columbus, Ohio.  
Gurey left Columbus earlier in the year to fight with Al Shabaab in Somalia, joining a 
number of other Ohio youth believed to have traveled to Somalia to fight with Al 
Shabaab since 2008.138  
There is a push by terror organizations like Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda to develop a 
new cohort of American recruiters to radicalize other American citizens.  Specifically, 
terror organizations are now customizing messages tailored to a peer audience of 
American youth.  The goal is to bridge the cross-cultural gap, to entice impressionable 
Americans, and make radical ideology more accessible and appealing.139 They even go 
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so far as to court U.S. youth with rap songs and via other media which would normally be 
in stark contrast to the strict version of sharia law they profess to uphold and enforce.  
Hammami, or al-Amriki, himself has released a series of five rap songs that praise the 
virtues of waging jihad on America.  These songs are delivered in English, and portray 
al-Amriki among other gun toting rebels using hip hop to speak lovingly of slaughtering 
crusaders; they also convey twisted history lessons sympathetic to jihadi holy warriors.140     
Many, such as Representative Peter King, chairman of the House Homeland 
Security Committee, speculate that attacks within the U.S. by Al Shabaab are highly 
likely.  It might not take as much as people suppose for Al Shabaab to refocus and 
mobilize it U.S. network in the U.S. Also worth worrying about is what will happen when 
radicalized American youth return to the U.S. following terrorist training and combat in 
Somalia.  Some argue that Al Shabaab is not capable of conducting a catastrophic 9/11 
style attack.  However, if Al Shabaab‘s anti-U.S. rhetoric switched from aspirational to 
operational, with an adequately resourced and distributed network, it could conduct a 
series of smaller coordinated attacks to have a catastrophic or crippling effect on the 
American people. 
In response to questions regarding Al Shabaab from the Senate Armed Services 
committee in June 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted the ―threat from Al 
Shabab [sic] to the U.S. and Western interests … and to the U.S. homeland is significant 
and on the rise.‖  Secretary Panetta also drew attention to the practice of Al Shabaab 
actively attempting to recruit from Somali diaspora communities within the U.S.141 
While Al Shabaab may be primarily concerned with toppling the Somali 
government, its ties to Al Qaeda should also be a concern.  Matt Olsen, Presidential 
nominee to head the National Counterterrorism Center, told a Senate committee that 
outside of Pakistan and Yemen, Al Qaeda‘s presence in Somalia is probably the next 
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most significant threat.   Olsen contends that Al Qaeda in Somalia is a noteworthy threat 
due to its outspoken willingness, apparent ability, and intent to strike targets outside 
Somalia.142 
2. Hizballah 
Like Al Shabaab, Hizballah represents another recognized terrorist organization 
whose activity along the U.S.-Mexico border poses a significant threat to national 
security.  Unlike the recent rise in Al Shabaab activity in the U.S., Hizballah has an 
extensive history of operating in the U.S. and Latin America.  Hizballah formed in 1982 
as a Lebanon-based radical Shia group, and was designated by the U.S. as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization in 1997.  Hizballah advocates for Shia empowerment within 
Lebanon, and supports the Palestine struggle against Israel.  Hizballah is also suspected 
of involvement in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks: the suicide truck bombing of U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut of 1983, the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut of 1983, 
the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, and the Kobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 
1996.  Hizballah operates primarily out of Beirut and southern Lebanon, but has 
established cells in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, South America, and North 
America.143 
In 2005, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was sentenced to 4½ years in prison under 
charges of providing materiel support to a terrorist group (Hizballah).  A Lebanese-born 
citizen, Kourani paid $3,000 to a corrupt official in the Mexican Embassy in Lebanon to 
obtain a fraudulent Mexican visa.  With Mexican visa in hand, Kourani entered what was 
deemed the Lebanon-Tijuana pipeline.  Kourani was eventually smuggled across the 
Mexican border and into California in 2001. Once inside the U.S., Kourani made his way 
north to Dearborn, Michigan where he worked as a carpenter.  While it is unknown 
whether Kourani acted under orders from his brother, a ranking Hizballah leader, it is 
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known that he helped raise donations and funnel money back to Hizballah terrorists.  
According to an FBI affidavit, Kourani raised over $40,000 which was sent back to 
Lebanon to support Hizballah activities.144 
In December 2002, the arrest of Salim Boughader Mucharrafille not only proved a 
sensational story about human smuggling, but raised a disturbing red flag to security 
analysts in the U.S.  Boughader was a Mexican citizen of Lebanese descent who operated 
the ―Café La Libanesa‖ in Tijuana, Mexico.  In addition to operating his modest café, 
Boughader was the mastermind of a Lebanese human smuggling operation.  Over a three 
year period Boughader successfully smuggled over 200 Lebanese individuals into the 
U.S. across the Mexican border.  Charging up to $4,000 per person, Boughader 
considered all Lebanese his brothers and readily admitted he made no distinction between 
assisting normal Lebanese seeking economic opportunity and known members of 
Hizballah.  Upon his arrest officials seized Boughader‘s meticulously well-kept 
notebook, full of names and dates.  While many of Boughader‘s clients were alleged to 
have links to Hizballah, one of his clients was a known worker for Al Manar, a global 
satellite television network owned by Hizballah and added to the DoS Terror Exclusion 
List in 2004.  Boughader used a variety of methods to get his clients across the border, 
often pairing them with migrants from different nationalities for safer passage.  He would 
send people through border points of entry in the trunks of vehicles, as well as send them 
on four hour long arduous journeys across the desert into California.   
Boughader pled guilty to charges of human trafficking in the U.S., openly relating 
the specifics regarding his part in the Lebanon-Tijuana pipeline.  Boughader‘s case is 
interesting not only for the apparent ease with which he moved Lebanese across the 
border, but he had been previously arrested and served time for human smuggling.  
Coincidentally, Boughader may have possibly assisted or smuggled Kourani into the 
U.S., although he does not recall.  More importantly, Boughader was the first human 
smuggler with suspected links to terrorists convicted in the U.S.145  
                                                 




While it is irresponsible to assume and difficult to determine whether any of the 
Lebanese Boughader assisted in sneaking across the border were actually terrorists or just 
Hizballah supporter/sympathizers, it is equally dangerous and naïve to assume away the 
possibility that terrorists might have reached U.S. soil through Boughader‘s operation or 
a similar as yet undetected human smuggling operation.  Michael Braun, a retired 
assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, told the Washington Times that Hizballah uses the same smugglers, 
document traffickers, and transportations experts as the criminal drug cartels.  Braun 
claims Hizballah‘s associations in these realms allow it to ―smuggle contraband into the 
U.S.; in fact, they already are.‖  Braun went on to comment that while Hizballah views its 
U.S. operations as a crucial revenue source, systems and conduits have been established 
specifically to move personnel across the border beyond the purview of U.S. law 
enforcement.146 
In a Channel 10 News interview in San Diego, a former U.S. intelligence agent 
speculated that Hizballah has been establishing a base of operations in Mexico over the 
past 15 to 20 years.  Concurring with Braun‘s assessment, Channel 10 suggested that 
Hizballah views the U.S. as a ―cash cow.‖  While attacks on U.S. soil do not seem 
preeminent on Hizballah‘s agenda, Hizballah continues to further engrain itself into 
North American Muslim communities.  Hizballah is now blending into Shia Muslim 
communities in the U.S. and Mexico, to include Tijuana.  This is even more troubling 
than Hizballah expanding into narcotics trafficking, since the continued assimilation into 
Shia Muslim communities could increase the potential for radicalizing peoples of these 
Muslim communities.147 
In July 2010, Mexican officials arrested Jamel Nasr in his home in Tijuana.  Nasr 
is a known member of Hizballah, and was allegedly the ringleader of a Hizballah attempt 
to establish a cell in Mexico.  Mexican authorities have yet to release all the details, but 
                                                 
146 Ben Conery, ―Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.,‖ The Washington Times, March 
27, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/27/hezbollah-uses-mexican-drug-routes-into-
us/  
147 ―Hezbollah considered to be more advanced than Al Qaeda,‖ 10News San Diego, May 4, 2011, 
http://www.10news.com/news/27780427/detail.html  
 69 
appear to have unraveled Nasr‘s involvement in a network that can be traced back to the 
Middle East.148  Nasr allegedly employed Mexican nationals with family ties in Lebanon 
to establish Hizballah support cells.  Mexican police conducted surveillance on Nasr prior 
to his arrest, noting he traveled frequently to Lebanon where it is suspected he received 
instructions and guidance directly from Hizballah‘s leaders.  Nasr also traveled to other 
Latin American countries and, in 2008, spent two months in Venezuela, a country known 
to support terrorist and anti-U.S. activities.149  While the investigation into Nasr 
continues, his activities demonstrate genuine attempts by terrorist organizations to 
establish support bases in Mexico, near the U.S. border. 
Hizballah has well established relations with numerous Lebanese diaspora 
communities throughout Latin America.  The largest Lebanese population outside of 
Lebanon is in Latin America, with a conservative estimate of over 8.5 million Lebanese 
living there and in the Caribbean.150  While Brazil is home to approximately 6 million 
Lebanese, other countries with significant Lebanese populations are Argentina, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Panama, and Mexico.  Emigrating from 
Lebanon in the late 1800s, Lebanese established communities that are now deeply rooted 
and fully assimilated in their host countries.  Their descendants have gone on to serve as 
presidents and prime ministers as well as successful businessmen. For example, Carlos 
Slim Helu, a self-made billionaire and son of a Lebanese immigrant, was the world‘s 
richest man in 2010 with a net worth of $53.5 billion according to Forbes magazine.151   
While Latin America‘s diaspora communities may be physically removed from 
Lebanon, they maintain connections through business, religious, and political affiliations, 
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as well as through charitable contributions.  Remittances from successful Lebanese 
communities provide over six billion dollars annually to the Lebanese economy.    
Lebanese immigrants to Latin America are well known for their work ethic and 
business savvy.  However, certain Lebanese diaspora communities are even better known 
for their involvement in criminal enterprises.  Most notably, Hizballah‘s deep roots and 
activities among the diaspora communities throughout Brazil and Argentina have drawn 
the attention of numerous counter-terrorism analysts.  The notorious Tri-Border Area 
(TBA) of South America, encompassing parts of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, has 
been synonymous with lawlessness and a haven for criminal syndicates.  Hizballah has 
taken full advantage of the TBA, where its fundraising capabilities have become 
legendary.  From its secure safe haven in the TBA, Hizballah conducts business locally 
and abroad, sending out operatives and developing ties with other transnational criminal-
terrorist networks.  Hizballah creates these alliances and symbiotic relationships not just 
for purposes of illegal trade, but to disperse its operatives and establish new cells.  
Hizballah has successfully expanded its networks from the TBA and South America, 
integrating itself into existing illicit networks in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Panama, Costa Rica and Mexico.152  Israeli security forces, sharing information with the 
U.S. about the TBA terrorist infrastructure, have revealed that Hizballah is ―deeply 
involved in the drug cartel … engaging in the cartel‘s money-laundering in several U.S. 
states, including Florida.‖153  As a 2004 CIA Counter Terrorism Center threat paper 
summarized, ―many alien smuggling networks that facilitate the movement of non-
Mexicans have established links to Muslim communities in Mexico.‖154 Through these 
networks, Hizballah now has relations to facilitate the smuggling of operatives not only 
throughout Latin America, up into Mexico, but across the border into the heartland of the 
U.S. 
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Hizballah‘s strength is not limited to support through alliances and partnerships 
with other criminal enterprises.  In his 2004 NPS thesis, Terrorism, Diasporas, and 
Permissive Threat Environments, Howard Meehan explains how Hizballah exploited the 
Lebanese diaspora to gather information on Israeli targets.  Meehan notes that Hizballah 
utilized diaspora members sympathetic to its ideological perspective to obtain 
information to conduct attacks against Israeli targets within Argentina in both 1992 and 
1994.155  While it is difficult to accurately assess levels of communal support for a 
criminal-terrorist enterprise within a diaspora, it is important to note the proven potential 
for a criminal-terrorist organization to activate a diaspora for illicit or adversarial means. 
Even though Hizballah may not plan to mount an attack in the U.S. right now, its 
ability to establish a solid network in South, Central, and North America means it has the 
capacity to move resources and assets undetected by law enforcement.  This also implies 
it has the capacity to conduct attacks and subversive activities within the U.S., when and 
where it chooses. 
3. Tamil Tigers 
Other ethnic based smuggling networks have also been implicated in attempts to 
smuggle terror operatives into the U.S. across the Mexican border.  Shortly after 
September 11, 2001, four operatives from the Sri Lanka Tamil Tiger group were caught 
attempting to sneak into the U.S.  The Tamil Tigers, or The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam, were the militant wing of the Sri Lankan independence movement, designated a 
Foreign Terror Organization by the U.S. in 1997.  The four Tamil Tigers were caught 
along with 17 other Sri Lankans, all posing as Mexicans attempting to enter the U.S. near 
San Ysidro and Otay Mesa.  ICE investigators speculated the four Tigers were trying to 
sneak into the U.S. from Mexico on their way to Canada, which is known to have a 
significant Tamil diaspora population.
156
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4. Iraqis 
In 2007, then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell gave a very 
candid and controversial interview to the El Paso Times in Texas while discussing the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  Director McConnell was remarkably frank about 
information that many might have considered classified, and he made some startling 
revelations.  Director McConnell said that terrorists were in fact coming across the 
Southwest border.  He alluded to a significant number of Iraqis having been smuggled 
across illegally that year.  McConnell could not provide a specific number, but said the 
number tripled in a single year wholly due to the fact that terrorists have figured out how 
to enter the U.S. this way.  McConnell also added that while some were caught, many got 
into the U.S. undetected.
157
   
In 2011, Federal officials in San Diego busted a drug trafficking ring involving 
members of the Iraqi immigrant community.  Over 60 individuals were arrested in El 
Cajon, a small suburb of San Diego.  Many of the suspects were Christian Iraqis, or 
Chaldeans, who fled Iraq due to persecution from Al Qaeda and other fundamentalist 
extremist groups.  Police confirmed that among the 60 people arrested, some were 
suspected of belonging to the Chaldean Organized Crime Syndicate.  The Chaldean 
Syndicate is an Iraqi criminal organization based in Detroit, Michigan, which is also 
home to the largest population of Chaldeans in the U.S.  Coincidentally, El Cajon, scene 
of the recent arrest, has the second largest population of Chaldeans in the U.S.  Officials 
raided an Iraqi Social Club, seizing over 3,500 pounds of drugs, more than 30 firearms, 4 
IEDs, and over $630,000 in cash.
158
  Officials revealed that the Chaldean Syndicate has 
historical ties to the Sinaloa cartel, one of Mexico‘s most powerful drug cartels.  Police 
believe the Chaldean Syndicate‘s ties with the Sinaloa Cartel provided it with access to 
drugs which were sold locally and transported to Detroit for distribution.  Ties between 
the Chaldean Syndicate and the Sinaloa Cartel also provided access to Mexican migrant 
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smugglers who assisted many Chaldeans in getting into the U.S.  The 60 individuals 
arrested face a combination of state and federal charges, with some being illegal 
immigrants who may face deportation charges as well.  Due to the ongoing investigation, 
officials could not comment on the number or status of the illegal immigrant Chaldeans 
arrested, but it is suspected that some may have passed through Tijuana or other border 
towns into California with the assistance of Mexican smugglers.
159 
 While the Chaldean 
Syndicate is primarily a criminal enterprise, it does represent the potential for non-
Mexican groups to work with Mexican smugglers to sneak people across the Mexican 
border into the U.S.  Not only could a terrorist group utilize a network in collaboration 
with Mexican smugglers, but terrorist operatives could then assimilate and hide in plain 
sight among a large ethnic diaspora within the U.S.  
5. The Chinese 
Chinese ―snakeheads‖ have been transporting people across the border between 
the U.S. and Mexico illegally since the 1800s.  The pipelines for getting Chinese opium 
onto the streets of California and the rest of the U.S. are well established and have 
evolved with the times.  Much as the drug trade has had to adapt to new types of 
surveillance, human smuggling too has become more complicated and circuitous.   
In Arizona alone, the U.S. Border Patrol reported the Tucson sector experienced a 
tenfold increase in the number of Chinese illegal immigrants caught trying to cross into 
the U.S. from Mexico.  In FY09, 332 Chinese immigrants were detained, compared to 30 
the year before.  In the first quarter of FY10, 281 illegal Chinese immigrants were 
arrested.  This sharp increase is indicative of the rise in smuggling in other states along 
the border between the U.S. and Mexico.  In one two month period at the end of 2008, 
Robert Rutt, head of ICE Criminal Investigations in Houston, Texas, noted ICE agents in 
the Houston area intercepted over 63 illegal Chinese immigrants.160 While the smuggling 
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of Chinese by snakeheads has waxed and waned over the years, the recent rise in 
apprehensions could signal a change in the overall dynamics.   
Simply put, trafficking in Asians and Chinese can be far more profitable than 
trafficking in Mexican immigrants.  For example, according to David Jimarez, U.S. 
Border Patrol spokesman, Chinese immigrants can pay over $40,000 to flee China and 
sneak into the U.S.  While this sum represents the total amount to get from China through 
Asia and Latin America, a significant chunk of it goes to smugglers at the U.S.-Mexico 
border—certainly more than the typical $1,500–$3,000 price most illegal Mexican 
immigrants pay.  Vincent Picard from ICE believes that, due to increased scrutiny and 
attention paid to traditional human smuggling practices, snakeheads have formed 
collaborative ties with Mexican smuggling operations.  Picard and Jimarez both point out 
that the price Chinese immigrants bring far exceeds that of other nationalities, which 
makes human smuggling of Chinese citizens increasingly lucrative as more and more 
drugs are seized by authorities.161   
Snakeheads typically prefer flying Chinese citizens into Latin American 
countries, then moving them over land up into northern Mexico, eventually handing them 
over to Mexican ―coyotes‖ (human smugglers) for transfer across the border into the U.S.  
A popular route is from China to Thailand, where fraudulent papers can be obtained for 
flights into Latin America.  Once in Latin America, many Chinese immigrants make their 
way to Belize.  Here they link up with Chinese-Belizean smugglers who are part of the 
large Chinese diaspora population in Belize, comprising almost three percent of the 
county‘s total population.162 From Belize, it‘s easy to get to Mexico and then northward. 
C. IF IT LOOKS MEXICAN AND SOUNDS MEXICAN…. 
Because Special Interest Aliens draw immediate attention from border officials, 
attempts are being made to reduce their signature and help them blend into the sea of 
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Latin American migrants attempting to illegally cross into the U.S.  Mexican smugglers 
not only provide guides, water, and pick-up rides on the U.S. side, but some smugglers 
are now coaching Middle Eastern immigrants on how to look and sound like Latinos.  In 
addition to helping Middle Eastern immigrants change their clothes and appearance, 
smugglers are also teaching immigrants phrases to help them pass as ordinary Hispanic 
immigrants.  In 2005, then-Director of the FBI Robert Mueller testified to the House 
Appropriations Committee:   
―There are individuals from countries with known Al Qaeda connections who are 
changing their Islamic surnames to Hispanic-sounding names and obtaining false 
Hispanic identities, learning to speak Spanish and pretending to be Hispanic.‖ 163 
Anthony Kimery echoes this in his 2010 ―Southern Exposure‖ article, writing that 
special schools are established by Muslim businessmen in alliance with Mexican cartel-
controlled human smuggling operations.  These schools assist the smuggling of terrorists 
by teaching them to speak Spanish and learn about Hispanic culture.  He attributes the 
decline in the apprehension of Special Interest Aliens by the Border Patrol to greater 
precautions, such as the masking of identities to prevent capture.164 
Of even greater concern to law enforcement is the detection of villages in 
northern Mexico where Middle Easterners are moving into towns.  Here Middle 
Easterners are changing their names to Hispanic names and learning to speak Spanish.  
Whether only temporary or intended for the long haul, this level of integration indicates a 
recognized effort by Middle Easterners to try to fit in among locals, some of whom may 
well be headed north of the border too.165  Establishing smaller Middle Eastern 
populations in villages and towns in northern Mexico suggests the potential for a much 
more elaborate and substantial support base on the Mexican side of the border than 
anything seen before.  Again, Thomas Davidson of the Jamestown Foundation speculates 
that a salafi network already exists in Mexico, running from the southernmost state of 
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Chiapas all the way north to the U.S.-Mexico border.  This network is positioned along 




D. MONEY TALKS 
If money becomes the primary motivator for smuggling networks and coyotes, 
then it would be safe to assume that terrorist operatives would have more than sufficient 
funds to entice a smuggler to sneak them into the U.S.  By using money as the primary 
motivator, any terrorist could conceal his association with a terrorist network, posing as 
another asylum seeker hoping for better economic opportunity.  Additionally, with more 
money comes greater sophistication.  Paying sums in excess of $10,000 would surely buy 
you more than a bottle of water and a few granola bars.  Sophisticated networks with 
established lookouts, safe houses, routes, encrypted radios, prepaid/throw-away cell 
phones, night vision devices, tunnels, etc. means less chance of detection.  For a terrorist 
organization that relies on secrecy to avoid law enforcement, less detection by authorities 
is always well worth the cost. 
High-priced smugglers would also be better resourced to avoided U.S. law 
enforcement measures, making it harder to assess correlations between arrests, crossing 
rates and the number who actually cross into the U.S. illegally. As the Director of 
National Intelligence said in 2007, there are already terrorists successfully crossing the 
Southwest border.167  If terrorists were to employ high price smugglers it will likely be 
even harder to assess how or when terrorist organizations are attempting to sneak their 
operatives across the border undocumented.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Somalis, Tamils, Lebanese, Iraqis and Chinese are just some of the diaspora 
groups that take advantage of vulnerabilities along our southern border.  Their 
resourcefulness and unrelenting desire to infiltrate personnel undetected into the U.S. has 
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been a source of frustration for border security and immigration enforcement officers 
alike.  There are ethnic diasporas within the U.S. representing almost all of the countries 
listed as Special Interest Countries by DHS. The potential for a terror operative to hide in 
plain sight should keep more Americans awake at night then it seems to.  
Unlike those who believe terrorist organizations are more likely to attack U.S. 
interests abroad, many, like Dennis Blair, previous Director of National Intelligence, 
think an attack within the U.S. by a terrorist organization is imminent.  When asked by 
the Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2010 to determine the 
probability of an attack within the U.S., Blair responded that the probability is certain. 
Top officials at the FBI and CIA concurred.168 
The truth is we do not know how many unreported individuals are here already. 
The cases reviewed in this chapter demonstrate the vulnerability of the border, and the 
potential for terrorists, recruiters, and others to get across.  People associated with various 
terrorist organizations and anti-U.S. agendas have already gotten into the U.S., and we do 
not know where they are, or what they are doing. 
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V. FUTURE SCENARIOS 
A. HOLLYWOOD 
While some discount the potential or temptation to terrorists to infiltrate the U.S. 
from Mexico, a scenario involving terror operatives sneaking across the border 
undetected is not too far-fetched.  The threat of this has already caught the eye of 
Hollywood, with shows like 24 in the U.S. and The Border in Canada depicting terror 
masterminds crossing illegally and undetected to organize and execute attacks inside the 
U.S.  There are even plans to release a full length feature film called ―Act of Valor‖ in 
which U.S. Navy SEALs attempt to stop a Chechen jihadist from working with a 
smuggler to sneak suicide bombers across the Mexican border to attack U.S. targets.
169 
 
B. CANADIAN BORDER 
As concerning as is the potential for terrorists to cross the southwestern border, 
the northern border between the U.S. and Canada is also highly vulnerable.  Mexico may 
continue to be attractive because of large semi-governed spaces, historic smuggling 
routes, protection from established human trafficking organizations, and the presence of 
support groups within ethnic diasporas.  However, as DHS continues to increase security 
measures along the southwestern border, this could make the U.S.-Canadian border more 
appealing.  Despite all the advantages associated with illegally crossing from Mexico, 
numbers recently released relating to the U.S.-Canada border are alarming.  According to 
a December 2010 GAO report, of the 4,000 miles of border Canada and the U.S. share, 
only 32 miles are adequately secured by the U.S. Border Patrol.  While the report 
indicates that border officials can detect illegal border crossings along 1,007 miles, less 
than 1% of the total northern border has acceptable levels of security.170  
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Canadian authorities counter these numbers with statistics showing that while 
450,000 illegal aliens were arrested crossing into the U.S. from Mexico, only about 7,500 
illegal aliens were detained crossing into the U.S. along the Canadian border.171  But 
these lower numbers can be deceiving for two reasons:  first, these numbers only reflect 
the number of illegal crossers caught by law enforcement. And second, it only takes a 
small handful of terror operatives entering the U.S. to pose significant security risks.  
Many, like Michael Cutler at the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, 
emphasize that relatively liberal political asylum rules for immigrants entering Canada 
are increasingly attractive to terror operatives seeking a pathway into the U.S.172  The 
perception of lax asylum laws combined with a low numbers of border security agents 
across long stretches of austere terrain make the Canadian border another attractive 
jumping off point for undocumented illegal entry into the U.S.     
Not only is the northern border nearly twice as long as the U.S.-Mexico border, it 
also includes large areas of heavily forested terrain and federally managed lands, along 
with the Great Lakes.  In the fall of 2006, investigators from the GAO conducted a 
security assessment to identify border vulnerabilities.  These investigators successfully 
crossed the northern border into the U.S. on three separate occasions without being 
caught by CBP.  This led the GAO to testify at a Senate Finance Committee hearing that 
there were ―substantial vulnerabilities in the northern border to terrorists or criminals 
entering the United States undetected.‖173   
Equally concerning are the arrests by Canadian authorities of terrorists intent on 
crossing into the U.S. to do harm.  Most famously, in December 1999, Canadian 
authorities arrested Ahmed Ressam when he attempted to smuggle explosives from 
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Canada into Washington State as part of the Millennium terrorist plot.174  More recently, 
the testimony from the 2006 arrest of the Toronto 18 indicated the group had plans to 
cross the border to carry out attacks inside the U.S.175  While these incidents do not 
indicate coordinated efforts for undetected infiltration, they do represent terrorists‘ 
attempts to use the northern border as an alternative method for entry into the U.S. 
C. STRATEGIES 
Stopping and deterring terrorist organizations from infiltrating operatives into the 
U.S. across the Mexican border is no simple task.  Lawmakers, law enforcement and the 
public all have opinions about which strategy is best to pursue.  While maintaining border 
integrity along the U.S.-Mexico border is problematic, attempts to stem the possible flow 
of illegal aliens with ties to terrorism must be done with care not to strangle tourist, 
commercial, or leisure cross-border traffic essential to border communities and both 
national economies.   
Many options exist. However, I will only examine three here:  increased 
patrolling of the border, increased use of observation and technology along the border, 
and prevention measures to shut down and deter would be smuggling networks. 
1. Patrolling the Border 
Increasing patrols and monitoring along the 1,901 mile southwestern border could 
undoubtedly impact illegal human smuggling.  Too often border officials find tracks, 
makeshift rafts, and a trail of trash strewn by smugglers.  An increased presence by 
border officials could effectively restrict the available passageways for smugglers, and 
reduce their ability to operate between the seams of border patrol detection systems.  
However, an increase in patrolling the border means increased costs in resources and 
manpower.  This, in turn, would likely mean a redirection of material and human 
resources from traditional ports of entry.   
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Constraints on human resources in the summer of 2010 led the DoD to authorize 
the deployment of 1,200 National Guard troops along the Mexican border in Arizona, 
Texas, California, and New Mexico.
176 
 While these troops provide support to the Border 
Patrol and local law enforcement the need for them points to the deficit in manpower 
among border and immigration authorities.  Additionally, this highlights that even with 
one thousand additional bodies, illegal smuggling across the border continues to be a 
problem. 
2. Observation Technology 
Advances in observation technology are increasingly attractive as the increased 
demand for border control officers puts a strain on both the budget and on the force itself.  
In addition to the competition for restricted resources, the sheer magnitude of combating 
both human and narcotics smugglers pushes U.S. and Mexican border officials to the 
limits of their capabilities.  However, advances in technology have allowed border 
control agencies to augment shortages in manpower and still maintain a watchful eye on 
the border.  Observation technologies such as ground sensors, day and night vision 
cameras, thermal imaging, and satellite tracking have helped border control agents better 
integrate and coordinate their activities and focus attention on high traffic areas.  
Advances in surveillance and reconnaissance technologies for austere desert 
environments developed in Afghanistan and Iraq are also being adopted and adapted.  
The integration of technology with human agents greatly increases the area that 
border control agencies can monitor.  However, observation technologies are only able to 
see violations, not stop them.  Maximizing the utility of these observation platforms still 
requires the work of agents on the ground.   Under-budgeted and under-staffed 
departments contending with the everyday physical challenges of traversing austere 
terrain can reduce border control agencies‘ abilities to act upon information gained in a 
time sensitive manner.  Further frustrating the use of observation technologies is the 
increasing sophistication of smugglers.  Defeating smugglers solely though observation 
technology is much akin to building a better mousetrap.  Smugglers are constantly 
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engaged in counter-intelligence activities, often specifically designed to undermine and 
ultimately defeat U.S. border control detection technologies. 
3. Prevention 
Prevention efforts in the first place are largely based on deterring people from 
attempting to illegally enter the U.S.  Prevention does not only include thwarting illegal 
smuggling attempts, but includes prevention of activities that occur both before and after 
individuals cross the actual border.  Networks can range in their sophistication from 
offering transportation up to, across, and northward away from the border, to fraudulent 
document procurement, to safe houses and the placement of illegal immigrants in 
diaspora or ethnic communities.  As immigration and border security officials unravel 
these networks they can prevent and deny smugglers the necessary resources and support 
to successfully traffic humans across the border.  By removing support mechanisms on 
the U.S. side, smugglers can be deterred from attempting to smuggle humans across with 
no viable means to avoid detection and guarantee passage for potential customers as they 
try to cross.   
Prevention efforts based on defeating human smuggling networks are time and 
resource intensive.  Unraveling networks often begins with random illegal immigrants 
caught by border patrol agents, and ends with a combination of law enforcement agencies 
attempting to uncovering illegal activities often woven into the fabric of legitimate life in 
U.S. communities.  For example, the Border Patrol may catch a random illegal alien who 
gives them the location, name, or time of a pick-up contact on the U.S. side.  The Border 
Patrol must now dedicate assets to finding and catching this contact, often on the basis of 
sketchy information.  If they successfully catch the contact on the U.S. side, officials 
must then determine the next link in the chain.  Oftentimes this leads them to rented ―safe 
houses‖ in average middle class neighborhoods. Here illegal immigrants are temporarily 
housed in rented homes until they can be moved north.  Jurisdictional issues, authorities, 
warrants, etc then take time to acquire, often requiring a significant investment of time 
and personnel.  
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4. A Combined Strategy 
Perhaps the optimal strategy is to combine patrolling, standoff observation, and 
prevention.   However, just as a long, tall and unmanned fence will not deter illegal 
human smugglers, increased patrolling of the border, observation technologies and 
prevention alone cannot stop or deter illegal human smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico 
border.  Integration of border patrolling with observation technologies can interrupt 
border crossing attempts and optimize the employment of human resources.  Observation 
technologies can allow officials to initially identify a smuggling operation.  That 
detection can assist with putting preventive measure in place.  Increased prevention 
efforts can decrease the available support for human smugglers, causing them to revert to 
traditional ports of entry, where it is already much easier to prevent illegal smuggling. 
D. COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
To defeat possible terror infiltration along the Southwestern border requires 
collaboration, to include increased communication and intelligence sharing among law 
enforcement institutions.  This should include those agencies south of the border that 
have not been subverted by the drug cartels.  It will not be enough to just realign 
strategies within individual agencies.  There needs to be a synchronized over-arching 
plan.   
1. Joint Task Forces 
The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) represents the most recognizable 
national effort to prevent domestic terrorist activities.  The FBI JTTF has offices in 106 
cities nationwide, and is comprised of over 4,400 members from over 50 federal agencies 
and 600 state and local agencies.177 It is these regional and local fusion efforts which 
really demonstrate the benefits of synchronized collection, analysis, and sharing of threat-
related information.  By leveraging national resources and databases, combined with 
gathering local knowledge and insight, local fusion centers prevent, protect, and rapidly 
                                                 
177 ―Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,‖ FBI.gov, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs. 
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respond to terror and crime-related activities.  Local level interaction with public and 
private sector partners can also facilitate crucial links between seemingly unconnected 
regional activities. 
Offices such as the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD LECC) 
exemplify such efforts to combine resources for maximizing results.  The SD LECC is 
comprised of representatives from the San Diego Sheriff‘s Department, FBI, California 
Department of Justice, California Highway Patrol, Federal DHS, Governor‘s Office of 
Homeland Security, California Emergency Management Agency, InfraGuard,178 and the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).   In August 2011, federal and local 
officials broke up the Chaldean drug smuggling ring operating outside San Diego, CA.  
As previously mentioned, officials were tipped off to illegal drug related activities at a 
local Iraqi nightclub by locals.  The ability to fuse local intelligence with national level 
tracking databases allowed authorities to obtain evidence to take down the network which 
crossed multiple state and international jurisdictions.  Information from the arrests, like 
the fact that several of the Chaldeans were helped by Mexican migrant smugglers to 
reach the U.S., will help local and national authorities‘ efforts to further unravel the 
network.179 
BESTs are another example of a joint task force.  As previously mentioned, 
BESTs are built around the specific and unique needs of the regions they operate in.  
Nationwide, between October 2008 and June 2010, BESTs initiated over 390 human 
smuggling investigations resulting in over 580 criminal arrests and over 360 
convictions.180  In August 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced the formation of the 
                                                 
178 InfraGard is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the private sector. 
InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, 
and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the 
United States. See http://www.infragard.net/. 
179 AP, ―Feds bust Iraqi-Mexican drug ring in Calif.‖  
180 Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling Across Our Borders, Testimony before 
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives, 111
th
 Cong. 14 (2010) (Statement of James A. Dinkins, Executive Assistant 
Director, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. ICE).  
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first Mexico based BEST, representing continued efforts to maximize effectiveness 
through bilateral, multi-agency collaboration.181 
2. Operation In Plain Sight 
Perhaps the best example of bilateral multi-agency collaboration is the successful 
execution of Operation In Plain Sight in 2010.  Operation In Plain Sight was a 
comprehensive year-long investigation into the illegal transportation of illegal aliens 
smuggled across the border into the Phoenix and Tucson areas.   The operation focused 
on human smuggling organizations using legitimate shuttle transportation companies as a 
front.  Smuggled aliens were brought across the border, then smuggled to various 
legitimate shuttle companies or safe houses in Tucson.  After receiving wired money 
through MoneyGram or Western Union, the smugglers transported the illegal aliens to 
various locations in Phoenix or to final destinations nationwide.  The investigation 
primarily focused on areas in Arizona, but given the breadth of the organization arrest 
warrants were served as far away as Tennessee.  Smuggled aliens identified in the 
operations were primarily from Mexico and Central America, but several came from 
more distant locations like China.  By dismantling some of Arizona‘s most prolific and 
profitable human smuggling operations, Operation In Plain Sight was dubbed ―the most 
comprehensive human smuggling investigation in ICE history.‖182   
The operation resulted from the collaborative efforts of more than 800 agents and 
officers from nine federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, to include the ICE 
Office of Investigations, ICE Detention and Removal, Border Patrol, CBP Field 
Operations, FBI, DEA, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service, Arizona Department of Public 
Safety, Phoenix and Tucson‘s Police Departments, and the Pima County Sheriff‘s Office. 
Additionally, the operation included unprecedented cooperation with agents from 
                                                 
181 Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States, Hearing before the 
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, United States Senate, 8 (2010)(Statement of Janice Ayala, 
Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. ICE).  
182 ―Commercial Transportation Companies Implicated in Sweeping ICE Investigation Targeting 
Arizona Human Smuggling Networks, 47 in Criminal Custody as Agents Execute Federal Search and 
Arrest Warrants Statewide,‖ U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, April 15, 2010, 
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Mexico‘s Secretaria Securidad Publica (SSP).  The combined task force was able to 
conduct near-simultaneous raids in the southern Arizona cities of Phoenix, Tucson, 
Nogales, and Rio Rico as well as make arrests in Sonora and Nogales in northern 
Mexico.  In total, the operation resulted in 61 criminal arrests, more than 500 additional 
administrative arrests, and the seizure of seven weapons and approximately 94 vehicles, 
as well as $80,000 in U.S. currency.
183
  The case indictments included criminal forfeiture 
of over $10 million in assets derived from the criminal conspiracy.
184
 
3. Community Self-Policing  
While immigration and border control officials succeed in unraveling smuggling 
networks, they still face significant obstacles.  Two of the most noteworthy are: first, 
limited language capabilities, specifically in languages spoken in diaspora communities; 
second, the lack of programs or compensation to incentivize communities to conduct 
more self-policing and report issues to law enforcement, and specifically to immigration 
enforcement officials.  
E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
Programs and initiatives intended to decrease the burden placed upon local and 
state authorities by identifying and deporting convicted felons and repeat offenders of 
immigration fraud are creating a rift between diaspora communities and law enforcement.  
Activists who oppose these programs insist that the communities initiatives are supposed 
to assist are increasingly likely to suffer hardships and succumb to the very threats the 
initiatives were designed to remove.   
1. Secure Communities 
One such program is the Secure Communities initiative, launched in 2008 to 
identify and remove dangerous threats from communities.  Secure Communities 
enhanced the criminal alien enforcement process through early identification of criminal 
                                                 
183 Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling Across Our Borders, 14.  
184 ―Commercial Transportation Companies Implicated in Sweeping ICE Investigation.‖  
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aliens, facilitating their expedited removal from the U.S. Participating local jurisdictions 
would then share fingerprints of individuals booked into jails with the FBI and DHS, 
checking against criminal record and immigration databases.  Secure Communities 
prioritizes removal actions, focusing on individuals who pose the most significant threat 
to public safety (e.g. those who have committed homicide, rape, robbery, kidnapping, 
major drug offenses and repeated violation of immigration laws).  Removing these 
convicted felons would alleviate burdens on local and state detention and prison systems.  
It would also prevent their potential reintegration back into the local communities they 
had often victimized prior to their conviction.  Touted as an initial success in 2009, the 
program expanded from 14 participating jurisdictions to more than 1,595 in 44 states in 
2011.  Since the activation of Secure Communities in 2008, the program has removed 
over 142,000 aliens and over 37,600 convicted criminal aliens.185 This year alone, 
through June 30, 2011, more than 86,000 immigrants convicted of crimes were removed 
from the U.S. as a result of the Secure Communities initiative. 186   
While DHS Secretary Napolitano and President Obama use these historic results 
to demonstrate commitment and tough enforcement of immigration laws, they often fail 
to acknowledge the growing undercurrent of dissent and resentment in the ―secure 
communities.‖  The program has come under considerable criticism, mostly thanks to the 
large percentage of those caught up in the Secure Communities system who are low level 
offenders.  Opponents condemn the program for disproportionally snagging minor 
offenders, domestic abuse victims, victims of assaults and other crimes, and individuals 
arrested but not convicted of an offense in addition to reporters or witnesses of crimes.  
For communities comprised of illegal immigrants, reporting a crime carries an inherent 
risk of being jailed and deported.  Even legal citizens in diaspora communities may fear 
harassment for themselves and their communities.  Pressure from law enforcement, 
                                                 
185 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability, 
Monthly Statistics through September 30, 2011 (Washington: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2011), 1.  
186 ―Secure Communities,‖ U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/. 
 89 
profiling and prejudice from the surrounding community, and the threat of reprisals on 
friends and family members increase the aversion to reporting a crime.   
2. Community Alienation 
A 2009 Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) survey of low income Latino 
communities revealed that only 46% of respondents said they have confidence in the 
police, in some regions the figure is as low as 27%.  The SPLC report asserts that 
immigrants often make a rational choice in deciding not to report crimes, especially 
where it is not uncommon for crime victims to become targets of investigations that lead 
to their deportation.  The fears and risks associated with reporting criminal activity to 
local law enforcement ―results in fear and distrust in the immigrant community and a 
general lack of cooperation with law enforcement.‖187 In addition to the many Latino 
advocacy groups speaking out against the program, numerous local police chiefs are also 
renouncing and opting out of it.
188
 
Local jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements only increase fear and anxiety among 
undocumented aliens and legal citizens, and make them more reluctant to inform law 
enforcement if they are victimized.  In Nashville, Tennessee alone, the SPLC survey 
reports that 73% of Latinos surveyed indicated they were more reluctant to cooperate 




While the SPLC survey deals exclusively with Latino communities, the distrust 
and reluctance to cooperate with law enforcement reverberates through other diaspora 
communities.  Despite high levels of assimilation for some in these communities, many 
still maintain a high degree of insularity.  In many diaspora communities there is a 
collective fear of prejudice, racial profiling, and xenophobia on the part of surrounding 
                                                 
187 Under Siege: Life for Low-Income Latinos in the South, Reporting Crime (Montgomery: Southern 
Poverty Law Center, 2009), 26.  
188 Paloma Esquivel, ―Immigrant Advocates Urge Ending Secure Communities Program,‖ Los 
Angeles Times, August 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/18/local/la-me-0817-secure-
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189 Under Siege, 27. 
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communities and law enforcement entities.  This is especially true in diaspora 
communities which are much smaller and less well established than Latino communities.  
Communities whose cultural, ideological, and religious views place high degrees of 
importance on community and family may experience significant friction with the 
concept of turning over members of the community to outside law enforcement.   
Perhaps the most commonsense approach is to establish citizen advisory boards 
and liaison groups with diaspora communities.  This could not only help local law 
enforcement develop positive relations with diaspora community leaders, but would help 
build a foundation for community policing.  Community leaders who would otherwise 
fear reprisals would feel empowered to serve as a buffer between wary members of the 
population and law enforcement.  With open dialogue and communication through 
advisory boards and liaison groups, law enforcement could address security issues in 
diaspora communities which might not have been brought to their attention previously.    
Fuller disclosure of crimes specifically committed and suspected to have been committed 
by both legal and illegal members of diaspora communities could likewise help reduce 
ambiguity.  By informing the general population of the frequency, severity, and impact of 
crimes, law enforcement officials could explain the need for security protocols.  By 
making the case for self-policing by the community, ideally law enforcement could get 
members of the community to help them identify potential recruiters or terrorist 
operatives long before the operational phase of an attack. 
3. Language 
Contributing to the rift between law enforcement and diaspora communities is the 
lack of foreign language capabilities among border security and immigration enforcement 
officers.  Even before the 9/11 attacks and the increased sensitivity to legal and illegal 
aliens within the U.S., then-Assistant Director of the FBI Investigative Services Division 
David Alba recognized the critical need for foreign language capabilities.  Alba not only 
advised there be an increase in Spanish-speaking capabilities for agents working on the 
border, but also advocated an increase in agents proficient in Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, 
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Korean, Farsi, and Vietnamese.190 Not only does the lack of foreign languages reduce the 
ability of law enforcement to communicate with their targets, it places them at risk.  
However, DHS currently has no mechanism for assessing its foreign language needs, and 
does not address foreign language needs in its Human Capital Strategic Plan.  Because 
DHS does not identify shortfalls in its foreign language programs, it is unable to 
effectively manage the programs and activities of its component agencies.  CBP has 
conducted two assessments since 2004, but those assessments primarily focus on Spanish 
language capabilities.  Specifically, CBP‘s foreign language capability assessment for its 
Office of Field Operations was limited to CBP officers along the southwest border, in 
Miami and in Puerto Rico.191  ICE, however, has not conducted an assessment of its 
foreign language capabilities, and relies on agents‘ knowledge of foreign languages they 
are exposed to in the daily execution of their duties.  In fact, ICE only reinstated Spanish 
language requirements four years after it chose to eliminate formal language training 
requirements for new ICE agents in 2003.192  Despite the fact that ICE agents frequently 
encounter non-English-speaking individuals, they often rely on foreign language 
interpreter services (to include for Spanish).193 This becomes especially problematic for 
agents who consistently interact with individuals whose language needs fall outside the 
limited Spanish training officers receive.  For example, in 2009 the ICE Office of 
Detention and Removal Operations experienced a critical need for Mandarin Chinese 
language speakers due to a surge in encounters with Chinese speakers near the Mexican 
border.194 Nor are Border Patrol agents offered training in languages spoken by natives 
of Special Interest Countries.  They do, however, have access to an over-the-phone, 24-
hour translation service in over 150 languages.  This is problematic not only for time 
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delays in reaching interpreters, but it muddles the ability of agents to conduct timely on-
the-spot discussions and resolve issues encountered in the field.195  
The inability to establish ties that make inroads into insular diaspora communities 
is one problem, but limited language capabilities also hamper developing potential 
informants.  For example, it is difficult to near impossible to assess and recruit a potential 
informant when the entire discussion has to occur through an unknown third party 
interpreter over the phone.  Not only is this interaction frustrated by language barriers and 
delays, it degrades the ability to establish trust and security between agent and 
informant.196   
The inability to communicate through a common language negatively affects the 
ability to develop criminal cases and increases the risk of loss or delay in intelligence as 
well as the likelihood of constitutional violations due to miscommunications.  Open 
discourse with community leaders is crucial for law enforcement to maintain visibility 
and react to events within diaspora communities.  Language capabilities alone will not 
ensure cooperation from diaspora communities, but something more has to be done to 
establish trust between law enforcement and the population in these communities.  
F. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
1. Recruiting within Diasporas 
Enhancing language capabilities through training may help, but the easiest way to 
tackle this problem is to recruit directly from the diaspora communities themselves. 
Having members of a diaspora community serve with law enforcement would not only 
reduce the perceived alienation of the community, but would also provide invaluable 
insights about community needs to the authorities.  While incentive and reward programs 
in agencies such as ICE and CBP exist for re-assigning current members of law 
enforcement proficient in authorized foreign languages, there need to be outreach 
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programs to actively solicit new recruits from within diaspora communities.
197
  These 
recruits would be held to the same rigorous vetting procedures, and go through the same 
operational training.  However, they would already be several steps ahead when it came 
to language or cultural training and re-training.   
Community outreach programs could not only identify and recruit youth with 
potential for service within law enforcement, they could also identify strong performers 
for educational incentives.  Providing positive avenues for idle youth would not only help 
divert their attention from gangs or dissident activities, but could provide more avenues 
for assimilation into the work force and society at large.  Furthermore, parents and 
community leaders with children invested in programs to better their future should be all 
the more likely to report terrorist associates who might ruin or destroy such programs.  
Giving diaspora youth positive outlets though educational incentives should also help 
inoculate them against the faulty logic in fundamentalist-extremist propaganda. 
2. DoD Language Capability 
While reward and incentive programs exist for current members of border 
security and immigration enforcement agencies, why not make use of other government 
institutions with distinct language capabilities?  DoD components possess a great number 
of proficient foreign language speakers, as well as many members native to particular 
diaspora communities within the U.S.  In addition to naturalized members of the armed 
services native to foreign countries, there exists a developed pool of operators who also 
possess specialized language and cultural expertise.  Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
operators not only have foreign language capabilities, but often have real world 
experience operating in countries which are home to ethnic diasporas within the U.S. and 
specifically from those countries designated as Special Interest Countries.   Why not 
develop an incentive program which would recruit in SOF veterans or National Guard?   
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3. Expansion of JTF-North 
Integrating DoD assets into joint operations with federal, state and local 
institutions has paid off in the past.  Beginning in 1989, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) 
served as the coordinating operational headquarters to support local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. across the 
southwestern border.  The success of JTF-6 not only highlighted the greater potential for 
military assistance with counter drug efforts, it led to expanded cooperation and 
partnership among military and civilian law enforcement agencies.  Renamed JTF-North 
under DoD Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2004, the task force‘s mission was 
expanded beyond counter-drug operations to include providing homeland security 
support to the nation‘s federal law enforcement agencies.  From the early days of JTF-6 
and the ―War on Drugs,‖ to the direct support of homeland defense by JTF-North, the 
task force has conducted over 6,000 missions with federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies. 
Perhaps the increased utilization of DoD assets — with appropriate changes or 
amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act — would not only increase deterrence for illegal 
cross-border human smuggling, but significantly reduce the capabilities of smuggling 
operations along the U.S.-Mexico border.  For example, NORTHCOM could increase the 
utilization of National Guard under Title 32, which allows National Guard forces to 
perform law enforcement tasks without the restriction imposed on active duty units under 
Posse Comitatus.  Using National Guard forces may also be well suited to assist on 
counter smuggling operations along the border, because they have roots in the 
community and because some state adjutants general also serve as both emergency 
managers and homeland security directors.
198
   
Despite not being able to perform law enforcement tasks, Title 10 active duty 
military units could provide more than aerial surveillance and rotary wing support to 
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border security and immigration enforcement operations.  The military has an 
unprecedented pool of experienced units and soldiers with ten years of continuous 
combat against asymmetric adversaries.  The asymmetric fighting in Afghanistan and 
Iraq has enhanced capabilities within the military for identifying, analyzing, and 
defeating illicit networks.  Why not utilize this body of knowledge and apply it to the 
fight against human smuggling operations in the southwest U.S.? While numerous 
military aviation units provide operational support to the Border Patrol and other agencies 
in the southwest, perhaps an increase in intelligence support and general support could 
further enhance counter-smuggling efforts.  Employing SOF operators who have 
extensive experience and expertise in defeating dark networks could provide invaluable 
insight into targeting and network analysis.  SOF operators and intelligence analysts 
could assist not only with techniques for preventing cross-border smuggling, but with 
identifying and defeating smuggling operations that operate within the U.S.  Additionally, 
SOF operators could provide increased general support though mobile training teams 
designed to share expertise with their civilian law enforcement counterparts and increase 
capabilities for operating in austere desert terrain to defeat transnational threats.  
4. Border Region Military Live Fire Training Areas 
While direct support to federal, state and local border security and immigration 
enforcement can help deter illegal cross-border smuggling, military activity in the 
southwest border region could also significantly deter would-be terrorist smugglers.  Just 
as many units utilize JTF-North taskings to train and hone their skills prior to deploying 
to Afghanistan and Iraq, why not open specific areas of the border region as military 
maneuver space?  Allowing military units to utilize the region as a live fire training area 
would not only increase the government/law enforcement presence in the area, but would 
potentially increase fear of apprehension (or death) by would-be illegal smugglers.  This 
would require changes or amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act, providing military 
units some capacity to detain illegal immigrants and smugglers until law enforcement 
arrived.  Military units would also have to develop very specific Rules of Engagement for 
encountering illegal aliens and smugglers, especially during live fire training events.  
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Some might object this would totally militarize the border region.  However, there is 
already a significant military and law enforcement presence in place, and military 
training areas would be well outside of high density urban areas.  The intent of 
establishing military live fire training areas is not to increase the mortality rate of illegal 
migrants, but rather to increase the fear factor and push undocumented travelers towards 
more built-up areas nearer to traditional ports of entry.  Ideally, it would deter them from 
trying to cross at all.     
Drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan will free up troops, allowing them to fill 
jobs and execute tasks not associated with deploying to combat theaters, to include 
supporting rotations to the border.  Not only would increasing military participation and 
partnership with domestic law enforcement and homeland defense organizations raise the 
country‘s collective ability to deter and defeat terrorism, but a military presence on the 
southern border would also put some teeth back into national security. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In 2010 the number of illegal immigrants apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol 
was 463,382.  Of these, there were 59,017 OTM aliens. Among these OTM aliens, 663 
were illegal immigrants from Special Interest Countries.
199
  If 663 ASIC apprehensions 
represent even 30%
200
 of the cross-border illegal immigrant traffic, an estimated 2,210 
Special Interest Country illegal aliens could have crossed the border into the U.S. 
undetected—in 2010 alone.  Given these staggering numbers, the potential for terrorist 
operatives to both mingle among these aliens and gain access to the U.S. is alarming.   
While some may write this off as alarmist and barn-burning sensationalism, the 
documented recent rise in homeland terror activities and verified human smuggling 
pipelines exhibit a very real threat to national security.
201
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This thesis was not written to forecast an inevitable attack on the U.S., but to 
examine how easy it would be for terror operatives to enter the U.S undetected by law 
enforcement.   By getting in, then hiding in plain sight and staying off law enforcement 
radar, the true danger they represent is the potential to establish dark networks of trained, 
financed, and prepared terror cells capable of conducting destabilizing attacks throughout 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 99 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
―Advance Policy Questions for the Honorable Leon Panetta Nominee to be Secretary of 
Defense.‖ United States Armed Services Committee, June 6, 2011. http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/06%20June/Panetta%2006–09–11.pdf  
 
Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community 
and the Threat to the Homeland, Majority Investigative Report, Committee on 
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 112
th
 Cong. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 2011. 
 
American Embassy Beirut. Engaging the Lebanese Diaspora, cable no. 1041/01. Beirut: 
U.S. Embassy, 2009. 
 





The Apache War on the Mexican Border. Excerpt from Pilcher, James E. ―Outlawry on 
the Mexican Border.‖ Scribner’s 1, no. 1 (1891). 
http://www.discoverseaz.com/History/ApacheWar.html 
 
Associated Press. ―Chertoff: End ‗Catch and Release‘ at Borders.‖ Fox News, October 
18, 2005. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,172570,00.html  
 
———. ―Feds Bust Iraqi-Mexican Drug Ring in Calif.‖ CBS News, August 11, 2011.  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/18/national/main20094401.shtml 
 
———. ―National Guard Troops Extend Stay at Mexico Border.‖ AZ Capitol Times, 
September 8, 2011.  http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/09/08/national-guard-
troops-extend-stay-at-mexico-border/ 
 








Bergen, Peter, Bruce Hoffman and Katherine Tiedemann. ―Assessing the Jihadist 
Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests.‖ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 34, no. 2 (2011): 65–101. 
 
 ―The Bracero Program.‖ http://www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html  
 
Bisant, David. ―William Gleaves and the Capture of Lothar Witke.‖ National Security 
Agency Newsletter 47, no. 7 (1999):1–16. http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/1999–07.pdf  
 
Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and the Department of 
Homeland Security Inspector General’s Office Collaboration in the Fight to 
Prevent Corruption, Hearing before Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery 
and Intergovernmental Affairs, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.  Statement of Charles K. Edwards, Acting 
Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011. 
 









Calavita, Kitty. ―The New Politics of Immigration: Balanced Budget Conservatism and 
Symbolism of Proposition 187.‖ Social Problems 43, no. 3 (1996): 284–305.  
 
Cashion, Ty. A Texas Frontier: The Clear Fork Country and Fort Griffin, 1849–1887. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.  
 
Cato (Counsel.). The Weaponization of Immigration. Backgrounder.  Washington: Center 
for Immigration Studies, 2008. 
 
Ceasar, Stephen. ―In Arizona, a stream of illegal immigrants from China.‖ New York 
Times, January 23, 2010.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/us/23smuggle.html 
 
Chow, Shern-Min. ―Homeland Security Alert:  Terror suspect may be headed to Texas 





Cloherty, Jack and Pierre Thomas. ―Congress: Border with Canada the Weak Link in 




―Commercial Transportation Companies Implicated in Sweeping ICE Investigation 
Targeting Arizona Human Smuggling Networks, 47 in Criminal Custody as 
Agents Execute Federal Search and Arrest Warrants Statewide.‖ U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, April 15, 2010. 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1004/100415phoenix.htm 
 








Contreras, Guillermo. ―Terrorists Might Be Among Us.‖ San Antonio Express-News, 
March 28, 2011. http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/article/Terrorists-might-be-
among-us-1309155.php 
 




Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Hearings before 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate. 109
th
 Cong. Statement 
of James Loy, Deputy Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
 
Davidson, Thomas. ―Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central 
America.‖ Terrorism Monitor 3 no. 22 (2005): 1–13. 
http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/jamestown.pdf  
 
DeLay, Brian. War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.  
 
Democratic Staff of the Homeland Security Committee. Decision Eliminating Spanish 
and Other Language Training for ICE Investigators Was a Mistake. Washington: 
U.S. House of Representatives, 2005.  
 102 
Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States, Hearing before 
the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, United States Senate. Statement 
of Janice Ayala, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. ICE. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010. 
 
Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling Across Our Borders, Testimony 
before Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, 
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 111
th
 Cong. 
Statement of James A. Dinkins, Executive Assistant Director, Homeland Security 
Investigations, U.S. ICE. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010. 
 
Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling Across Our Borders, Testimony 
before Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, 
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 111
th
 Cong. 
Statement of Janice Kephart, Center for Immigration Studies. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 2010. 
 
Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling Across Our Border, Hearings before 
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism of the 
Committee of Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 111
th
 Cong. 
Statement of Michael Fisher, Chief of Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010. 
 
Esquivel, Paloma. ―Immigrant Advocates Urge Ending Secure Communities Program.‖ 




―Fact Sheet: ICE Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2006.‖ Department of Homeland 
Security, October 30, 2006. 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1162228690102.shtm 
 
―Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative.‖ Department of Homeland Security, November 2, 
2005. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm  
 
Freeze, Colin. ―U.S. border chief says terror threat greater from Canada than Mexico.‖ 




Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. ―Jihad Recruiting Effort May Explain Missing Somalis in 




Gato, Pablo and Robert Windrem. ―Hezbollah builds a Western Base.‖ MSNBC.com, 
May 9, 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-
americas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/ 
 
Gilderhus, Mark T. ―The United States and Carranza.‖ The Americas 29, no. 2 (1972): 
214–231.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/979900  
 
Ginsburg, Susan. Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy. 
Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2006.  
 
Gonzalez, Daniel and Dan Nowicki. ―GAO Report Reveals a Rift Over National Guard‘s 




Guerette, Rob T. and Ronald V. Clarke. ―Border Enforcement, Organized Crime, and 
Deaths of Smuggled Migrants on the United States – Mexico Border.‖ European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 11, no. 2 (2005): 159–174. 
 
Heagney, Meredith. ―Somali Youth Event Focuses on Service, Leadership.‖ The 




Hernandez, Daniel. ―Cartel Corruption Reaches Into the Ranks of U.S Border Agents, 




―Hezbollah considered to be more advanced than Al Qaeda.‖ 10News San Diego, May 4, 
2011. http://www.10news.com/news/27780427/detail.html  
 




House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations. Michael T. 
McCaul, Chairman. A Line in the Sand:  Confronting the Terror Threat at the 
Southwest Border. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006.  
 
Hsu, Spencer S. ―Agency Plans to Improve Oversight of Immigrant Detention.‖ The 




———. ―Arrest of VA man spotlights Al Qaeda‘s new American recruiters.‖ The 
Washington Post, Aug 1, 2010. From Pro Quest. 
Hughes, Dana, Kirit Radia and Jason Ryan. ―American Jihadi killed in Somalia 




Immigration and Naturalization Service. Backgrounder:  Immigration Enforcement in 
Arizona – 1997–2000. Washington: Department of Justice, 2000.   
 
INS Reorganization. Washington: American Immigration Lawyers Association, 2001.   
 
Investigation of Mexican affairs, Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate.  66
th
 Cong. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1919. 
 





Kephart, Janice. ―Catch and Release Redux.‖ Center for Immigration Studies, October 
2009. http://www.cis.org/Kephart/ICEDetentionReform 
 
Kimery, Anthony. ―Southern Exposure.‖ Homeland Security Today Magazine 7, no. 8 
(2010): 24–33. 
 
———. ―Unholy Trinity.‖ Homeland Security Today Magazine 6, no. 8 (2009): 24–36. 
 
Khoury , Jack and Haaretz Service. ―Mexico thwarts Hezbollah bid to set up South 




KSAZ Phoenix. ―Far Less People Entering U.S. Illegally from Mexico.‖ Fox News 




Kyle, David and Rey Koslowski. Global Human Smuggling: Comparing Perspectives. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
 
 105 
Lacey, Marc. ―Smugglers Guide Illegal Immigrants with Cues Via Cell Phone.‖ The New 
York Times, May 9, 2011.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/us/09coyotes.html  
 




Levine, Mike. ―Al Qaeda Linked American Terrorist Unveiled, as Charges Await Him in 
U.S.‖ Fox News, September, 4, 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2009/09/04/al-
qaeda-linked-american-terrorist-unveiled-charges-await/  
 




Liu, Irene Jay. ―Smuggled Chinese Travel Circuitously to the U.S.‖ NPR, November 20, 
2007.  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16422719 
 
Llana, Sara Miller. ―Iran assassination plot: Terrorists join forces with Mexican drug 





Mazzetti, Mark. ―Senators warned of terror attack on U.S. by July.‖ New York Times, 
February 3, 2010.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/politics/03intel.html?pagewanted=print 
 




McGevna, Allison A. ―Somalian Terror Organization Shabaab al Mujahideen Looks to 
‗Throw the West into Hell.‘‖ Fox News, November 25, 2008. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,457226,00.html  
 
Meehan, Howard V. ―Terrorism, Diasporas, and Permissive Threat Environments: As 
Study of Hizballah‘s Fundraising Operations in Paraguay and Ecuador.‖ Master‘s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hizb-
fund.pdf 
 
Meissner, Doris and Donald Kerwin. DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and 
Correcting Course. Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2009. 
 
 106 




Miryekta, Cyrus. ―Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America.‖ Small Wars 
Journal (2010): 1–13. 
 
Moon, Thomas N. and Eifler, Carl F. The Deadliest Colonel. New York: Vantage, 1975. 
 
Moon, Tom. This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert 
Operations in World War II. Los Angeles: Burning Gate, 1991.  
 
Morton, John. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Aliens. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Memorandum, 
Policy Number 10075.1.  Washington: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2011.   
 
National Homeland Security Council 118 – Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Vote 
of No Confidence: In ICE Director John Morton and ICE ODPP Assistant 
Director Phyllis Coven. Washington: American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFL-CIO), 2010.   
 
New York State Intelligence Center. The Vigilance Project:  An Analysis of 32 Terrorism 
Cases Against the Homeland. New York:  New York State Intelligence Center, 
2010.   
 
The Office of Border Patrol and the Office of Policy and Planning. National Border 
Patrol Strategy: Office of Border Patrol. Washington: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, 2004.   
 
Office of the Inspector General. An Investigation of travel reimbursements in connection 
with the INS’s Operation Safeguard: Executive Summary. Washington: 
Department of Justice, 2002. 
 
―Ohio Man Sentenced to Ten Years Imprisonment for Conspiracy to Provide Material 
Support to Terrorists.‖ Department of Justice, November 27, 2007. 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07_nsd_944.html 
 




Perez, Evan. ―Charges Link U.S. Recruits to Somalia.‖ Wall Street Journal, November 
24, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125901181331361185.html  
 107 
 
Pinkerton, James. ―Smuggling of Chinese into Texas is on the rise.‖ Houston Chronicle, 
December 24, 2008.  http://www.chron.com/news/article/Smuggling-of-Chinese-
into-Texas-is-on-the-rise-1766172.php 
 
―Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.‖ FBI.gov. 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs 
 
Rippy, J. Fred. ―The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and 
Mexico, 1848–1853.‖ The Hispanic American Historical Review 2, no. 3 (1919): 
363–396.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2505956.pdf?acceptTC=true 
 
Roberts, Chris. ―Transcript:  Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.‖ El 
Paso Times, August 22, 2007. http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_6685679 
 
Roberts, Mary Rose. ―Napolitano Pitches Southwest Border Initiative, Announces End to 




 ―Salvaging the I.N.S.‖ New York Times, August 10, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/10/opinion/salvaging-the-ins.html 
 
Sawyer, Jeffrey. ―CBP opens Office of Alien Smuggling Interdiction.‖ U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Today, Apr/May 2007. 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2007/apr_may/alien_smuggle.xml 
 
―Secure Communities.‖ U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ 
 
Shahid, Aliyah. ―Canadian border poses bigger terror threat to U.S than Mexico border.‖ 
New York Daily News, February 2, 2011.  http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011–
02–02/news/27738771_1_northern-border-border-patrol-agents-mexico-border  
 
Shane, Scott. ―Canadian Border Proves Difficult to Secure.‖ The New York Times, June 5, 
2006.  http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/americas/05border.html  
 
Sobelman, Daniel. ―Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area.‖ Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, November 21, 2001. from IHS Jane‘s database. 
 
Spence, Richard B.  ―K.A. Jahnke and the German Sabotage Campaign in the United 




Swarns, Rachel. ―Tight Immigration Policy Hits Roadblock of Reality.‖ The New York 
Times, January 20, 2006. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/national/20border.html?pagewanted=all 
 
Terrorist Groups: Al Shabaab. The National Counterterrorism Center. 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html 
 
Terrorist Groups: Hizballah. The National Counterterrorism Center. 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hizballah.html 
 
Thomas, Greg A. ―Posse Comitatus and the use of the Military in Denying Terrorist 
Access to the United States Along the Border with Mexico.‖ Strategy Research 
Project, U.S. Army War College, 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA433672 
 
Thomas, Pierre. ―Exclusive: FBI Says Corrupt Border Officials Accepting Bribes Expose 




 ―Top Official Says Feds May Not Process Illegals Referred From Arizona.‖ Fox News, 
May 21, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/21/official-says-feds-
process-illegals-referred-arizona/ 
 




Tuchman, Barbara. The Zimmerman Telegram. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 
 
Under Siege: Life for Low-Income Latinos in the South, Reporting Crime. Montgomery: 
Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009.  
 
United States Government Accountability Office. Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better 
Address Alien Smuggling Along the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative 
Resources and Measuring Program Performance, Testimony before 
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives. Statement of Richard M. Stana, 
Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 2010. 
 
———. Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 
Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, Report to Congressional 
Requesters. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010. 
 109 
 
———. Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest 
and Northern Borders, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2011. 
 
———. Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 
Southwest Border, report no. 11–374T, Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives. Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011. 
 
———. Department of Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Comprehensively Assess Its 
Foreign Language Needs and Capabilities and Identify Shortfalls, Report to the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 
and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2010. 
 
———. Southwest Border: Border Patrol Operations on Federal Lands, Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, 
Committee on Natural Resources, and the Subcommittee on National Security, 
Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives. Statement of Anu Mittal, Director 
Natural Resources and Environment. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2011. 
 
United States of America vs. Nuradin M. Abdi., ―Government‘s Motion to Detain 
Defendant. S.D. Ohio 2004. 
 








U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. Final Response to Freedom of Information Act Request: 
Judicial Watch. Washington: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice. Operation Gatekeeper: Background to the Office of the 
Inspector General Investigation.  Washington: Department of Justice, 2007.  
 
 110 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS 
Interoperability, Monthly Statistics through September 30, 2011. Washington: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011.  
 




U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Border Security: 
Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens, report no. RL33097.  
Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005.   
 
———. Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker Programs by 
Andorra Bruno, Report no. RL32044. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2006. 
 
Vaughan, Jessica. ―ICE Adopts Catch and Release for 287(g).‖ Center of Immigration 
Studies, June 2009. http://www.cis.org/Vaughan/CatchandRelease-287(g) 
 
Verdery, C. Stewart Jr. Brick by Brick: A Half Decade of Immigration Enforcement and 
the Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Washington: Center for 
American Progress, 2010.    
 
―The Vigilance Project:  An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases Against the Homeland.‖ 
New York State Intelligence Center. December 2010,  
http://info.publicintelligence.net/NYSIC-VigilanceProject.pdf 
 




Warner, Michael.  ―The Kaiser Sows Destruction: Protecting the Homeland the First 
Time Around.‖ Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 3–9. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol46no1/pdf/v46i1a02p.pdf    
 
Winter, Jana. ―Feds Issue Terror Watch for the Texas/Mexico Border.‖ Fox News, May 
26, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/05/26/terror-alert-mexican-border/ 
 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Dr. Anna Simons 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Dr. Leo Blanken 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
